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NOTES
TO CATCH A PREDATOR OR TO SAVE HIS
MARRIAGE: ADVOCATING FOR AN EXPANSIVE

CHILD ABUSE EXCEPTION TO THE MARITAL
PRIVILEGES IN FEDERAL COURTS
Emily C. Aldridge*
In prosecutionsfor child abuse, the government's most valuable witness
is often the defendant's spouse. Ordinarily, the maritalprivileges allow a
witness to refuse to testify or a defendant to bar his or her spouse's
testimony. When a defendant is on trialfor a crime committed against a
child, however, the privileges are unavailable. Although this exception
aims to serve justice on behalf of innocent children, its applicability often
hinges on the relationshipbetween perpetratorand victim. In some federal
courts, the minor victim must be the child or stepchild of the defendant,
while others have held the exception applicable even when the child is not
relatedto the defendant. This Note addresses the injustice inherent in such
a distinction, which protects some child victims of abuse better than others.
Beginning with a background of the child abuse exception in federal courts,
this Note then presents the currentforms of the exception across the federal
courts of appeals as well as in military courts-martial. Ultimately, this
Note concludes that because the effective prosecution of child abusers is
more important than the preservation of the defendant's marriage, all
federal courts should adopt an exception that would eliminate the marital
privileges in prosecutions for the abuse of any child, regardless of the
child's relationshipto the defendant.
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INTRODUCTION

On May 10, 2005, detectives in Edmonton, Canada, executed a search
warrant at twenty-nine-year-old Shon Lindstrom's house, resulting in the
seizure of numerous violent and graphic videos and pictures depicting the
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sexual abuse of children as young as newborns.' After Lindstrom's arrest,
which led to twelve charges against him related to child pornography and
the sexual abuse of four Canadian children, 2 Lindstrom cooperated with
Canadian investigators. 3 Lindstrom's tips led to an international probe that
resulted in more than sixty arrests in Canada, the United States, Great
4
Britain, Europe, and Australia.
One of the arrests made was that of Jerry Levis Banks, the American'5
moderator and host of an Internet chat room called "Kid Sex and Incest."
Banks, a convicted sex offender, used the chat room to find other
pedophiles and child pornographers, including Lindstrom. 6 Lindstrom told
police that Lindstrom had videotaped himself sexually abusing his
stepchildren and sent the videos over the Internet to Banks. 7 In return,
Lindstrom said, Banks sent him videos via the Internet of Banks sexually
abusing his grandson. 8 Videos on Lindstrom's computer corroborated his
story. 9 A Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agent, following
Lindstrom's tip, contacted a detective in Florida who was trained to pose
undercover on websites such as the "Kid Sex and Incest" chat room. 10 The
detective posed as Lindstrom and entered the chat room to obtain
information about Banks, subsequently discovering numerous child
pornography files available for download from other users.11 FBI agents
subsequently executed a search warrant at Banks's house in Boise, Idaho,
where agents seized Banks's computer and electronic storage devices. 12
Following a bench trial, 13 Banks was convicted of the possession,
14
production, transportation, and receipt of images of child pornography.
1. United States v. Banks, No. 1:06-cr-00051-BLW-WBS, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
82368, at *1-3 (D. Idaho Oct. 27, 2006) (order denying motion to suppress), ajfd, 556 F.3d
967 (9th Cir. 2009); Florence Loyie, Man Charged in 'HorribleAbuse' of Children: Suspect
Faces 12 Charges After Computer Containing Pornography Seized, EDMONTON J., June 10,

2005, at B5. The investigators described the pornography seized as depicting "horrible
abuse" and "torture." Loyie, supra.
2. Loyie, supra note 1.
3. See Banks, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82368, at * 1.

4. Loyie, supra note 1; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Man Sentenced to Life in
Prison for Producing Video of Toddler Being Sexually Abused (Apr. 16, 2007),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2007/April/07-crm.249.html
[hereinafter
DOJ
Press

Release]; Press Release, Fed. Bureau of Investigation Salt Lake City, Appeals Court
Upholds Conviction of Boise Sex Offender (Feb. 26, 2009), http://saltlakecity.fbi.gov/

dojpressrel/pressre109/slc022609.htm [hereinafter FBI Press Release].
5. Banks, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82368, at *2; KIVI-TV Today's 6 News, Boise Man

To Be Sentenced in International Pornography Case, http://www.kivitv.com/global/
story.asp?s=6186334&ClientType=Printable (last visited Feb. 20, 2010).
6. See Banks, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82368, at *1-2; FBI Press Release, supra note 4.
7. Banks, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82368, at *1.

8. Id. at *1-2.
9. Id. at *2.

10. Id. at *3.
11. Id.

12. Id.
13. See United States v. Banks, 556 F.3d 967, 971 (9th Cir. 2009); Waiver of Trial by
Jury and Waiver of Special Findings of Facts at 1, United States v. Banks, No. 1:06-cr0005 1-BLW-WBS (D. Idaho Nov. 13, 2006).
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The U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho sentenced him to life in
15
prison without parole, plus sixty years.
Banks appealed the district court's admission of the testimony of his
wife, Kathryn Banks, arguing that her testimony was inadmissible under the
federal common-law testimonial privilege allowing a defendant to prevent
his or her spouse from testifying about a confidential communication the
defendant made to the witness-spouse. 16 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit agreed,' 7 rejecting the district court's admission of Kathryn
Banks's testimony under an exception to the privilege providing that the
"'privilege should not apply to statements relating to a crime where a
spouse or a spouse's children are the victims.""' 18 The district court had
reasoned that even when the victim was the defendant's grandchild and not
his own child, society's strong interest in prosecuting a child abuser
prevailed over protecting a marriage the court perceived as damaged
beyond repair. 19 The Ninth Circuit, however, held that this child abuse
exception to the marital communications privilege did not apply in cases of
20
abuse of grandchildren.
In so holding, the Ninth Circuit established precedent that threatens to
undermine future federal prosecutions of defendants who have abused
unrelated children or young relatives other than their children.
Unfortunately, these scenarios of abuse are fairly common, and defendants
inevitably attempt to bar incriminating testimony of their spouses whenever
possible.2 1 Society's interest in successfully prosecuting defendants who
have abused children, both sexually and physically, 22 outweighs the public
14. Judgment at 1, Banks, No. I:06-cr-00051-BLW-WBS (D. Idaho Apr. 16, 2007); see
also 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (2006) (describing federal offenses related to child pornography);
Banks, 556 F.3d at 971.
15. See Judgment, supra note 14, at 2; FBI Press Release, supra note 4; Posting of Betsy
Z. Russell to The Spokesman-Review's Eye on Boise Blog, http://www.spokesman.com/
blogs/boise/2007/apr/16/not-just-life-but-life-plus-60/ (Apr. 16, 2007, 11:54 EDT).
16. Banks, 556 F.3d at 974; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1318 (9th ed. 2009)
(defining the marital communications privilege).
17. Banks, 556 F.3d at 977.
18. Id. at 974 (quoting United States v. White, 974 F.2d 1135, 1138 (9th Cir. 1992)).
This Note refers to this exception as the "child abuse exception."
19. Id. at 975-76.
20. Id.
21. See infra Part II.
22. Although the majority of cases cited by this Note were prosecutions for sexual abuse
of children, this does not reflect on the applicability of the child abuse exception in cases of
nonsexual abuse. Rather, it relates to the fact that in cases of abuse of an unrelated child,
seventy-eight percent of the cases relate to sexual abuse. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., MALE PERPETRATORS OF CHILD MALTREATMENT: FINDINGS FROM NCANDS

20 tbl.5 (2005), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/05/child-maltreat/report.pdf.
This
Note's reasoning is also especially pertinent in cases of sexual abuse of minors because of
the morally abhorrent nature of the crime, which further justifies the abrogation of the
privilege.
In addition, although this Note attempts to use gender-neutral language whenever
possible, at certain points-for example, in the Note's title-it has proven impossible. The
choice to refer to the defendant-spouse as male at these points reflects the sobering fact that
in reported cases of sexual abuse, on which this Note focuses, the vast majority of
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policy underlying the marital privileges. To preempt courts that may rely
on United States v. Banks 23 to exclude a spouse's testimony in child abuse
prosecutions, this Note proposes that federal courts adopt an expansive
child abuse exception to the marital privileges that would apply in cases of
abuse of any minor, regardless of the child's relationship to the defendant.
An expansive child abuse exception would accomplish two important
goals. First, it would serve justice to victims and society at large by
assisting the government in crafting effective prosecutions and securing
convictions of guilty child abusers. Second, by sending child abusers to
prison, it would prevent future instances of abuse, both by keeping the
criminal away from children during his or her term of imprisonment and by
deterring him or her with the belief that a future prosecution will result in
another conviction.
To familiarize the reader with the federal common law of marital
privileges, this Note first presents a brief overview of all testimonial
privileges, 24 followed by a history and analysis of Federal Rule of Evidence
501, the only Rule of Evidence related to privileges, and one that provides
only minimal guidance to courts developing laws of privilege. 2 5 Part I then
details the development of the marital privileges available to defendants and
their spouses in federal courts, 26 accompanied by a summary of the most
commonly cited rationales for the existence of the marital privileges. 2 7 Part
I concludes by outlining the exceptions to the marital privileges courts have
listing
created, 2 8 explaining the history of the child abuse exception, 29 and
30
the current forms of the exception, which vary among jurisdictions.
Part II uses the Ninth Circuit's surprising decision in Banks to study the
various approaches of federal courts regarding the child abuse exception.
Part II first examines the application of the child abuse exception in the
Ninth Circuit as stated in Banks, 31 and offers support from the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, and
the Uniform Rules of Evidence. 32 Next, Part II discusses the child abuse
exceptions used in military courts-martial, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit, and the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas,
perpetrators are men. One government study has shown that of the defendants prosecuted by
the federal government for sexual abuse of children in 2006, 96.4% were men. OFFICE OF
JUSTICE PROGRAMS,

DEP'T OF JUSTICE,

U.S.

FEDERAL

PROSECUTION

OF CHILD SEX

EXPLOITATION OFFENDERS, 2006, at 5 tbl.6 (2007), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/

content/pub/pdf/fpcseo06.pdf. For arrestees charged with child pornography, 98.7% were
men. Id.
23. 556 F.3d 967.
24. See infra Part I.A.1.
25. See infra Part I.A.2.

26. See infra Part I.A.3
27. See infra Part I.A.4.
28. See infra Part I.B.1.

29. See infra Part I.B.2.
30. See infra Part I.B.3.
31. See infra Part II.A. 1.
32. See infra Part II.A.2.
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all of which have adopted child abuse exceptions broader than those of the
Eighth and Ninth Circuits. 33 Part II concludes by providing support for
these forms of the child abuse
exception in state court decisions and in the
34
work of legal commentators.
This Note ultimately recommends that all federal courts adopt an
expansive form of the child abuse exception that would invalidate the
marital privileges in all proceedings related to the abuse of any child,
regardless of the child's relationship with the defendant or the defendant's
spouse. 35 This suggested approach, although unprecedented in its breadth
of protection, is appropriate because the medley of child abuse exceptions
in federal courts is the result of inconsistent applications of Federal Rule of
Evidence 501.36 An all-inclusive child abuse exception falls well within the
guidelines provided by Federal Rule of Evidence 501. 37 Part III balances
the policies underlying the marital privileges with those behind the
privileges' exceptions and concludes that society's great interest in
admitting a witness-spouse's testimony against a defendant-spouse always
38
outweighs the benefits of the marital privileges in cases of child abuse.
I. THE CHILD ABUSE EXCEPTION TO THE MARITAL PRIVILEGES

Part I of this Note traces the evolution of the child abuse exception to the
marital privileges in federal courts. Part L.A provides the reader with a
description of the confines of the marital privileges, as developed by federal
courts and as codified in the Federal Rules of Evidence. Part I.B then
details the common-law child abuse exception to the marital privileges.
A. The Two MaritalPrivileges
Part I.A. 1 gives a brief overview of testimonial privileges at federal
common law. Part I.A.2 goes on to explain why the Federal Rules of
Evidence do not include specific rules about privileges. Next, Part I.A.3
defines the two types of marital privileges: the adverse spousal testimony
privilege and the marital communications privilege. Finally, Part I.A.4
details courts' rationales for the existence of the marital privileges.
1. A Brief Overview of Testimonial Privileges
A testimonial privilege bars a court from compelling testimony from a
witness in a professional or confidential relationship with a party in a court
proceeding. 39 A testimonial privilege may be held by the witness, who may
33. See infra Part II.B.1-2.

34. See infra Part II.B.3.
35. See infra Part III.
36. See infra Part III.A.
37. See infra Part III.B.

38. See infra Part III.C.
39. See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE: PRACTICE
UNDER THE RULES § 5.1, at 303 (3d ed. 2009); Wendy Meredith Watts, The Parent-Child
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invoke the privilege to refuse to testify, or by the party, who may invoke the
40
privilege to prevent a witness from testifying.
Privileges are unusual in the realm of evidentiary law because they
hinder, rather than facilitate, the judiciary's search for truth by excluding
41
accurate, reliable evidence that sometimes is otherwise unattainable.
Society, however, views privileged relationships as so valuable that they
justify impeding the search for truth. 42 This concept, though heavily
criticized, 43 is firmly entrenched in judicial systems across the world and
has been traced back to ancient Rome. 44 In creating privileges, courts and
legislatures emphasize the importance of "encouraging the free flow of
information" 4 5 and protecting "privacy, freedom, trust, and honor in
personal and professional relationships. ' 46 Examples of relationships that
merit such protection are those between attorneys and clients, 4 7 priests and
penitents, 48 psychotherapists and patients, 4 9 and, most importantly for the
50
purposes of this Note, husbands and wives.

Privileges: Hardly a New or Revolutionary Concept, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 583, 586
(1987); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 16, at 1316-19 (defining privileges).
40. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 39, § 5.3, at 303; Kimberly Ann Connor,
Note, A Critique of the Marital Privileges: An Examination of the Marital Privileges in the
United States Military Through the State and FederalApproaches to the MaritalPrivileges,
36 VAL. U. L. REV. 119, 130 (2001).
41. See Watts, supra note 39, at 586-87; cf FED. R. EvID. 102 (stating that the Federal
Rules of Evidence aim to ascertain the truth and encourage "justly determined"
proceedings).
42. See Watts, supra note 39, at 587; Connor, supra note 40, at 131.
43. See, e.g., ACLU v. Finch, 638 F.2d 1336, 1344 (5th Cir. 1981) ("Privileges are
strongly disfavored in federal practice." (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710
(1974))); Connor, supra note 40, at 132, 143; infra Part II.B.3 (discussing criticisms of the
marital privileges).
44. See JOHN APPLETON, THE RULES OF EVIDENCE:

STATED AND DISCUSSED 144-45

(Phila., T. & J. W. Johnson & Co. 1860) (citing ancient Roman, Scottish, and Muslim laws
that prohibited witnesses "united by the ties of relationship, of friendship, or of mutual
dependence and support" to a party at trial from testifying). For a thorough historical
overview of the development of evidentiary privileges in U.S. law, see Watts, supra note 39,
at 586-90.
45. Connor, supra note 40, at 132-33.
46. Id.
47. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (describing the
attorney-client privilege as "the oldest of the privileges for confidential communications" at
common law).
48. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980) ("The priest-penitent privilege
recognizes the human need to disclose to a spiritual counselor, in total and absolute
confidence, what are believed to be flawed acts or thoughts and to receive priestly
consolation and guidance in return.").
49. See, e.g., Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 15 (1996) (recognizing a privilege
protecting confidential communications between a licensed psychotherapist and his or her
patient in the course of diagnosis or treatment).
50. See, e.g., Trammel, 445 U.S. at 42-53; United States v. Marashi, 913 F.2d 724 (9th
Cir. 1990).
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2. The Failed Codification of Privileges
The Federal Rules of Evidence (the Rules) codify federal common-law
rules of evidence. 51 The Rules, however, do not codify specific privileges,
'52
which are the "last bastion of the federal common law of evidence.
In 1961, the Judicial Conference of the United States 53 authorized Chief
Justice Earl Warren to appoint a Special Committee on Evidence to decide
whether the formation of uniform federal rules of evidence was advisable
and feasible. 54 On December 11, 1961, the Special Committee submitted
its report recommending the promulgation of rules of evidence for use in
federal courts. 55 On March 8, 1965, Chief Justice Warren appointed the
Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules (Advisory Committee) 56 to draft
federal rules of evidence and submit them to the Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure (Standing Committee), the Judicial Conference, and
the U.S. Supreme Court for approval. 57 The proposed rules would finally
58
take effect upon Congress's review and approval.
On March 31, 1969, four years after Chief Justice Warren's commission
of a draft of federal rules of evidence, the Standing Committee published
and circulated the first draft of the Rules, accompanied by explanatory notes

51. For a comprehensive overview of the federal rulemaking process, see Paul R. Rice &
Neals-Erik William Delker, Federal Rules of Evidence Advisory Committee: A Short
History of Too Little Consequence, 191 F.R.D. 678, 679-86 (2000).
Each state has developed its own evidentiary common law that is distinct from
federal common laws of evidence, though the two may coincide. See MUELLER &
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 39, § 5.7. Most states have codified the common law developed
by the courts of the state. See, e.g., infra notes 209-14 and accompanying text (listing state
privilege laws, both codified in statutes and developed in courts).
52. Michael W. Mullane, Trammel v. United States: Bad History, Bad Policy, and Bad
Law, 47 ME. L. REv. 105, 118 (1995).
53. 28 U.S.C. § 331 creates the Judicial Conference of the United States, consisting of
the Chief Justice, the chief judge of each federal circuit, a district court judge from each U.S.
federal judicial district, and the chief judge of the Court of International Trade. See 28
U.S.C. § 331 (2006).
54. S.REP. No. 93-1277, at 1 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7051;
Anthony Lewis, Warren Names Panel To Explore Uniformity in Rules of Evidence, N.Y.
TIMES, May 18, 1961, at 19. One responsibility of the Judicial Conference is to review
federal rules of practice and procedure, a task for which the Conference has created the
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, commonly known as the Standing
Committee. See 28 U.S.C. § 331; JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., JURISDICTION OF
COMMITTEES
15-16
(2009),
available
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/judconf/
09 SepJuris_StatementsFinal.pdf (describing the duties of the Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure).
55. S.REP. No. 93-1277, at 1,reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7051-52.
56. Id. Members of the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules include judges,
lawyers, and teachers. See, e.g., U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL RULEMAKING: RULES COMMITTEES
PAST MEMBERSHIP LISTS (1964), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/1964.pdf

(listing members of the 1964 Special Committee on Evidence).
57. See U.S. Courts, Federal Rulemaking:
The Rulemaking Process,
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/newrules3.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2010) [hereinafter The
Rulemaking Process].
58. See id.
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of the Advisory Committee. 59 Lawyers and judges had one year in which
to submit their comments 60 and proceeded to publish numerous comments
about the first draft, 6 1 resulting in revised drafts in March 1971,62 October
1971,63 and November 1972 (the Final Revised Draft). 64
The Court sent the Final Revised Draft to Congress for approval, after
which the Rules would go into effect on July 1, 1973.65 When the
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the House Judiciary Committee held
six days of hearings on the proposed Rules, however, the issue of privileges
proved divisive, stalling proceedings. 66 Article V, which codified commonlaw evidentiary privileges, contained thirteen rules, 6 7 nine of which defined
68
specific privileges to be recognized by federal courts: required reports,
lawyer-client, 69
psychotherapist-patient, 70
husband-wife
adverse
testimony, 7 1 clergy-penitent, 72 political vote, 73 trade secrets, 74 secrets of
59. See Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States District
Courts and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161 (1969) [hereinafter Preliminary Draft].
60. See Victor E. Schwartz, The Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence: An Introduction
and Critique, 38 U. CIN. L. REV. 449, 452 (1969).
61. See, e.g., A Discussion of the ProposedFederalRules of Evidence Before the Annual
Judicial Conference Second Judicial Circuit of the United States, 48 F.R.D. 39, 45 (1969)
(statement of David Berger, Esq.) (voicing his opinion to the U.S. Court of Appeals of the
Second Circuit that the Advisory Committee had gone too far in eliminating the marital
communications privilege); Donald J. Farage, Critique of Proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence, 1970 A.B.A. SEC. INS. NEGL. & COMPENSATION L. PROC. 433; Ray McNichols,
Some Random Thoughts on the ProposedFederal Rules of Evidence, 7 IDAHO L. REV. 187
(1970); Schwartz, supra note 60, at 453-87 (discussing proposed Rules that the author
regarded as "new or controversial").
62. Revised Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and
Magistrates, 51 F.R.D. 315 (1971).
63. Although no official citation of this draft of the Rules is available, a copy of the
minutes of the September 30-October 1, 1971 meeting of the Standing Committee, which
details the Committee's responses to suggested amendments, is available. See Standing
Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Meeting Minutes (Sept. 30-Oct. 1, 1971),
availableat http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/ST09-1971 -min.pdf.
64. See Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183
(1972).
65. See H.R. REP. No. 93-650, at 3-4 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075,
7077.
66. See 120 CONG. REC. 40,891 (1974) (statement of Rep. Hungate) ("Without doubt,
the privilege section of the rules of evidence generated more comment or controversy than
any other section. I would say that fifty percent of the complaints received by the Criminal
Justice Subcommittee related to the privilege section."). In fact, after it became clear that
members of Congress would not be able to reach consensus on the Rules by July, they
enacted a bill to delay the effective date of the Rules until "expressly approved by Act of
Congress." See H.R. 3694, 93d Cong. (1973); House Holds Up Code of Evidence:
Imposition of New Rules for Federal Courts Delayed, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1973, at 19
(citing controversial provisions in the Code, including the husband-wife and doctor-patient
privileges, as reasons for Congress's desired delay).
67. See Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. at 23062.
68. See id. at 234-35.
69. See id. at 235-40.
70. See id. at 240-44.
71. See id. at 244-47; infra notes 95-130 (discussing the adverse spousal testimony
privilege, one of two types of marital privileges).
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state and other official information, 75 and identity of informer. 76 Rule 501
of the Final Revised Draft specified that any alleged privilege not
77
enumerated in Article V, including the marital communications privilege,
was thereby eliminated and could not be given effect unless of
78
constitutional dimension.
At the hearings, members of Congress heard objections to the
codification of federal privileges 79 and the content of the specific
81
privileges, 80 including the reduction in the scope of marital privileges.
The ensuing dispute over the privileges threatened to undercut the
82
codification of any federal rules of evidence.
After two years of fruitless debate, Congress decided to omit precise
rules about evidentiary privileges from the Rules, 83 leaving Rule 501 as the

72. See Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. at 24749.
73. See id. at 249.
74. See id. at 249-51.
75. See id. at 251-54.
76. See id. at 255-58.
77. See infra notes 131-52 and accompanying text (discussing the marital
communications privilege).
78. See Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. at 23034.
79. See, e.g., Rules of Evidence: Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on Reform of
Fed. CriminalLaws of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,93d Cong. 174-75 (1973) (statement
of Charles R. Halpem and George T. Frampton, Jr., on behalf of the Washington Council of
Lawyers) (objecting to the proposed Rules' abrogation of state privileges).
80. See, e.g.,, id. at 47 (letter to Hon. Warren E. Burger from Hon. Richard G.
Kleindienst, Attorney General of the United States) (suggesting changes to the
psychotherapist-patient privilege); id. at 174-75 (statement of Charles R. Halpern and
George T. Frampton, Jr., on behalf of the Washington Council of Lawyers) (objecting to
Article V because it "contracts the zone of personal privacy, enhances governmental secrecy,
and is biased in favor of lawyers and against the poor"); id. at 242 (letter to Rep. Hungate
from Charles L. Black, Luce Professor of Jurisprudence, Yale Law School) (objecting to the
lack of a general physician-patient privilege in proposed Rule 504).
81. See, e.g., id. at 7 (statement of Hon. Bertram L. Podell, Rep. in Congress from the
State of New York) (referring to the confidential spousal communications privilege as a
"bastion of privacy" and stating that the lack of such a privilege is an attack on the principle
of a confidential relationship); id. at 47 (letter to Hon. Warren E. Burger from Hon. Richard
G. Kleindienst, Att'y Gen. of the United States) (suggesting amendments to the husbandwife privilege in proposed Rule 505); id. at 174-75 (statement of Charles R. Halpern and
George T. Frampton, Jr., on behalf of the Washington Council of Lawyers) ("Because the
rules eliminate the traditional confidentiality of the marriage relationship, it would appear
that what the businessman tells his lawyer over lunch is no longer privileged if he also tells it
to his wife over dinner."); id. at 240-44 (letter to Rep. Hungate from Charles L. Black, Luce
Professor of Jurisprudence, Yale Law School) (objecting to Rule 505's elimination of the
spousal marital communications privilege).
82. S. REP. No. 93-1277, at 6 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7053
(stating that the inability of Congress to agree on the scope of privileges in the Rules
"threatened to forestall or prevent passage of an entire rules package").
83. The House of Representatives passed H.R. 5463, the legislative embodiment of the
proposed rules, on February 6, 1974. Id. at 6, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7052. For a
thoughtful study of the failed codification of privileges, see Edward J. Imwinkelried, Draft
Article V of the Federal Rules of Evidence on Privileges,One of the Most InfluentialPieces
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only mention of privileges in the Federal Rules of Evidence. 84 Rule 501
provides that "the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or
political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the
common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States
in the light of reason and experience." 85 Rule 501 addressed objections to
the Rules' feared usurpation of state privilege laws 86 by instructing that "in
civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or
defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, [privileges] shall
87
be determined in accordance with State law."
Congress clarified that the decision not to codify privileges was not
meant to convey disapproval of the concept of privileges in either state or
federal courts. 88 To the contrary, Congress wished privileges to remain in
89
their current common-law forms unless modified by the federal courts.

of Legislation Never Enacted: The Strength of the Ingroup Loyalty of the FederalJudiciary,
58 ALA. L. REV. 41 (2006).
84. See FED. R. EVID. 501.
85. Id. The language of Rule 501 originated in Benson v. United States, 146 U.S. 325
(1892), in which the U.S. Supreme Court reexamined the issue of whether a codefendant was
competent to testify against an accused. Id. at 336. The Court stated that it was not
"precluded by [precedent] from examining this question in the light of general authority and
sound reason." Id. at 335. The phrase evolved into "reason and experience" in Wolfie v.
United States, 291 U.S. 7 (1934), in which the Supreme Court held that evidentiary rules are
"governed by common law principles as interpreted and applied by the federal courts in the
light of reason and experience." Id. at 12 (citing Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371
(1933)).
86. See, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein, The Uniformity-Conformity Dilemma FacingDraftsmen
of FederalRules of Evidence, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 353 (1969).
87. FED. R. EVID. 501. This provision left state privilege law applicable in both state
criminal and civil proceedings and in federal civil proceedings governed by state law. See
id.; MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 39, § 5.7 (explaining when state privilege law
applies). Problems arise when state and federal privilege laws conflict and a federal court is
trying both state and federal claims, but in such cases, courts have held that federal privilege
law applies to all claims to reduce confusion. See 2 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL., FEDERAL
RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL § 501.02[3], at 501-11 (9th ed. 2006) (citing Hancock v.
Hobbs, 967 F.2d 462 (11 th Cir. 1992)).
88. See S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 13, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7059 ("It should
be clearly understood that, in approving this general rule as to privileges, the action of
Congress should not be understood as disapproving any recognition of a psychiatrist-patient,
or husband-wife, or any other of the enumerated privileges contained in the Supreme Court
rules."); 120 CONG. REC. 40,891 (1974) (statement of Rep. Hungate) (stating that Congress's
omission of specific privileges "cannot be interpreted as a congressional expression in favor
of having no such privilege" or of annulling state privilege laws).
89. See 120 CONG. REC. 40,891 (statement of Rep. Hungate) ("Rule 501 is not intended
to freeze the law of privilege as it now exists. The phrase 'governed by the principles of the
common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of
reason and experience,' is intended to provide the courts with the flexibility to develop rules
of privilege on a case-by-case basis."); S. REP. No. 93-1277, at 13, reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7059 ("[T]he recognition of a privilege based on a confidential relationship
and other privileges should be determined on a case-by-case basis.").
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3. The Marital Privileges
Among the numerous types of common-law testimonial privileges
approved by courts, 90 marital privileges have enjoyed a long history of
acceptance. 9 1 Federal courts recognize two types of spousal privileges 92 :
the adverse spousal testimony privilege 93 and the marital communications
privilege. 94 This section discusses each in turn.
a. The Adverse Spousal Testimony Privilege
The adverse spousal testimony privilege 95 allows a witness to refuse to
testify against his or her spouse, regardless of the source of the witness's
knowledge. 9 6 The privilege dates back to the seventeenth century, when
courts followed the rule of spousal incompetency, which dictated that wives
and husbands were "incompetent," or unqualified, to testify against their
spouses. 97 At the time, courts still adhered to the common-law rule of
coverture, or the legal fiction that upon marriage, a wife's legal identity
merged with that of her husband, rendering them one person in the eyes of
the law. 98 Courts prohibited parties to the action from testifying, so as one
legal person who was a party to the action, neither husband nor wife could
90. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
91. See Brown v. State, 753 A.2d 84, 89 (Md. 2000) (describing limitations on spousal
testimony as "ancient"); Watts, supra note 39, at 586-87.
92. See, e.g., Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 45 n.5 (1980) (stating that the
adverse spousal testimony privilege and marital communications privilege are two distinct
privileges); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 39, §§ 5.31-.32; Milton C. Regan, Jr.,
Spousal Privilege and the Meanings ofMarriage,81 VA. L. REV. 2045, 2052, 2055 (1995).
93. See infra notes 95-130 and accompanying text.
94. See infra notes 131-52 and accompanying text.
95. The adverse spousal testimony privilege is also known as the spousal testimonial
privilege, see, e.g., United States v. Jarvison, 409 F.3d 1221, 1231-32 (10th Cir. 2005);
MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 39, § 5.31, at 416, the adverse testimony privilege,
see, e.g., In re Witness Before the Grand Jury, 791 F.2d 234, 236-38 (2d Cir. 1986), and the
anti-marital facts privilege, see, e.g., United States v. Allery, 526 F.2d 1362, 1367 (8th Cir.
1975). The "adverse spousal testimony privilege" is the name most federal courts give this
privilege. See, e.g., United States v. Griffin, 440 F.3d 1138, 1143 (9th Cir. 2006).
96. Mullane, supra note 52, at 107.

97. See

HUMPHREY DAVENPORT, AN ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LORD COKE'S COMMENTARY

6 (photo. reprint 1979) (1651) (stating that, at common law, a wife could not
"be produced either against, or for her husband, quia sunt duae animae in came una [for
they are two souls in the same flesh]"), quoted in 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON
EVIDENCE § 2227, at 212 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). But see 8 WIGMORE, supra, § 2227, at
211 (asserting that "the wife's testimony on her husband's behalf is treated as receivable,
while his privilege to keep her from testifying against him is apparently sanctioned" (citing
Bent v. Allot, Cary, 94, 94-95, 21 Eng. Rep. 50, 50 (Ch. 1580))).
98. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 44 (1980); Steven N. Gofman, Note,
"Honey, the Judge Says We're History": Abrogating the Marital Privileges via Modern
Doctrines of Marital Worthiness, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 843, 846 n.17 (1992); see also Linda
L. Ammons, What's God Got To Do With It? Church and State Collaboration in the
Subordination of Women and Domestic Violence, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 1207, 1252 (1999)
(explaining the origins of the term "coverture" (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
ON LITTLETON

COMMENTARIES *442)).
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testify.99
The U.S. Supreme Court abrogated the rule of spousal
incompetency in 1933,100 but preserved the adverse spousal testimony
privilege to provide some protection of the defendant's marriage.' 0 1
The adverse spousal testimony privilege has three prerequisites. 102 First,
the privilege may be invoked only in criminal proceedings. 10 3 Second, the
couple must be lawfully married at the time of trial. 10 4 In other words, the
adverse spousal testimony privilege does not survive the end of the
marriage. 10 5 Finally, the party invoking the privilege may only block
adverse testimony, or testimony that tends to incriminate the defendant
spouse. 10 6 Courts conflict on the issue of whether the privilege prevents
07
testimony regarding events occurring prior to the couple's marriage.
99. See Trammel, 445 U.S. at 43-44; see also Mullane, supra note 52, at 116. For a
thorough history of the common-law doctrine of spousal incompetency and its evolution into
the marital privileges, see Brown v. State, 753 A.2d 84, 88-96 (Md. 2000), and R. Michael
Cassidy, Reconsidering Spousal Privileges After Crawford, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 339, 355-58
(2006). The reader should be aware that some state statutes misleadingly use the words
"incompetent" or "not competent" to indicate the existence of a privilege. See, e.g., MD.
CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-105 (LexisNexis 2006); Brown, 753 A.2d at 96 (holding
that the language of section 9-105 "does not render a spouse 'incompetent' in any manner,
but simply provides a privilege").
100. See Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 386-87 (1933).
101. See id. at 373 (making clear that the Court does not address the defendant's wife's
ability to testify against the defendant).
102. See Amanda H. Frost, Updating the Marital Privileges: A Witness-Centered
Rationale, 14 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 12 (1999).
103. See, e.g., Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 77 (1958) ("[T]he law has refused
to pit wife against husband or husband against wife in a trial where life or liberty is at
stake."); In re Martenson, 779 F.2d 461, 463 n.6 (8th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted)
(supporting its position with proposed Rule 505(a)); 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A.
BERGER, WEINSTEIN's FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 505.04 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., Matthew
Bender 2d ed. 1997 & Supp. 2009). But see Ryan v. Comm'r, 568 F.2d 531, 544 (7th Cir.
1977) ("We acknowledge that an argument can be made that no policy supports the
distinction between allowing the privilege against adverse spousal testimony in criminal
cases but not in civil cases.").
104. See, e.g., United States v. Bad Wound, 203 F.3d 1072, 1075 (8th Cir. 2000)
(requiring that the witness-spouse and the defendant be married "at the time of trial" to
invoke the adverse spousal testimony privilege). Common-law marriages are considered
"lawful" marriages only in jurisdictions that recognize common-law marriages as valid. See,
e.g., United States v. Acker, 52 F.3d 509, 514-15 (4th Cir. 1995) (prohibiting the accused
from asserting the privilege against a man with whom she had lived for twenty-five years
when the state did not recognize common-law marriages); United States v. Snyder, 707 F.2d
139, 147 (5th Cir. 1983).
105. See, e.g., United States v. Termini, 267 F.2d 18, 20 (2d Cir. 1959) (stating that "it is
well settled that the privilege ends with the dissolution of the marriage as by divorce"
because the purpose of the privilege is to prevent divorce (citing Pereira v. United States,
347 U.S. 1, 6 (1954))).
106. See, e.g., Hawkins, 358 U.S. at 76-78; 1 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF
FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 505.1, at 565 (4th ed. 1996) (explaining that favorable testimony is not
protected because it does not threaten the harmony of the marriage).
107. CompareUnited States v. Van Drunen, 501 F.2d 1393, 1397 (7th Cir. 1974) (finding
that although the defendant and witness were married at the time of trial, the privilege did
not apply because the testimony concerned events occurring prior to the marriage), with A.B.
v. United States, 24 F. Supp. 2d 488, 492 (D. Md. 1998) (holding that the privilege may be
invoked even to protect matters that occurred before the marriage).
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The purpose of the privilege is to foster marital harmony, both for the
benefit of the individual couple and for society as a whole. 108 When the
Supreme Court first recognized the adverse spousal testimony privilege in
Hawkins v. United States,' 09 both the witness-spouse and the defendantspouse had the right to invoke the privilege."l 0 The Supreme Court
believed that a witness-spouse's testimony against his or her defendant
spouse, regardless of whether the testimony was compelled or voluntary,
would disrupt marital harmony, undermining the purpose of the
privilege."'I
The Supreme Court later overruled part of Hawkins in Trammel v. United
States,1 12 holding that only the witness-spouse held the adverse spousal
testimony privilege." 3 In Trammel, the defendant had been charged with
importing heroin into the United States from Thailand and the Philippines
and conspiring to distribute the drugs. 114 Over Trammel's objection, the
U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado had permitted Trammel's
wife, a coconspirator, to testify against him pursuant to an immunity
agreement with the government.' '5 The prosecutor's entire case against
Trammel rested on his wife's testimony. 116 A jury convicted Trammel,
who appealed, arguing that under the adverse spousal testimony privilege as
developed in Hawkins v. United States, he could prevent his wife from
testifying against him. 1 17 On appeal, the Supreme Court upheld his
conviction, scaling back the adverse spousal testimony privilege in the
18
process by allowing only the witness-spouse to hold the privilege."
The Trammel Court based its decision on three grounds. 119 First, the
Court read Rule 501, providing that courts may interpret common-law
privileges "in the light of reason and experience,"' 120 to mean that the
Supreme Court could revise the privileges when necessary.121 To reach this
conclusion, the Court analyzed Congress's rejection of the nine codified
privileges in the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, including
Representative William Hungate's statement during the congressional
108. See, e.g., Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40,44 (1980); Hawkins, 358 U.S. at 78
(opining that a spouse's adverse testimony would likely destroy his or her marriage with the
defendant); United States v. Allery, 526 F.2d 1362, 1365 (8th Cir. 1975).
109. 358 U.S. 74.
110. See id. at 74-75, 77 (holding that a court could not compel a witness-spouse to
testify against his or her spouse and that the voluntary testimony of a witness-spouse would
not be admitted without the consent of the defendant-spouse).
111. See id. at 77-79; see also Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 14 (1934); Stein v.
Bowman, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 209, 221-22 (1839).
112. 445 U.S. 40.
113. Id. at53.
114. Id. at42.
115. Id. at 42-43.
116. Id.
117. Id. at43.
118. Id. at53.
119. Id. at 47-53.
120. FED. R. EVID. 501.

121. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 47-48.
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hearings that the purpose of Rule 501 was to "'provide the courts with the
flexibility to develop rules of privilege on a case-by-case basis.""' 122 The
Trammel Court concluded from the congressional record that Congress's
desire in enacting
Rule 501 was to leave the law of privilege open to change
23
and evolution. 1

Next, as part of its Rule 501 "reason and experience" analysis, the Court
looked to state law to ascertain the states' views of the adverse spousal
testimony privilege.1 24 The Court found that nine states vested the adverse
spousal testimony privilege in the witness-spouse alone and that seventeen
125
states had abolished the privilege altogether in criminal proceedings.
The Court stated that the trends in state privilege law were especially
26
relevant because marriage is traditionally a concern of state laws. 1
Finally, the Court found insufficient public policy to support the adverse
spousal testimony privilege, which was the broadest of all the common-law
testimonial privileges, as well as one of the most criticized due to its origin
in the rule of spousal incompetency. 127 The Trammel Court argued that the
"archaic notion[]" that a woman, as a type of chattel, did not merit a legal
identity separate from her husband and could not decide for herself whether
to testify against him, had "long since disappeared." 128 The Court also
theorized that a witness-spouse's decision to testify against his or her
spouse reflected the fact that the couple's marriage was likely already
damaged beyond repair. 129 In that instance, the Court reasoned, the
testimony could not serve its purpose of protecting the marital relationship,
so there was little logic in allowing the defendant-spouse to invoke the
130
privilege.

122. Id. at 47 (quoting 120 CoNG. REc. 40,891 (1974) (statement of Rep. Hungate)).
123. Id. (citing S. REP. No. 93-1277, at 12 (1974), reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051,
7058-59; H.R. REP. No. 93-650, at 8 (1973), reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075, 708283).
124. Id. at 48-50.
125. Id. at 48 n.9. The Court found that, since Hawkins in 1958, seven states had stopped
allowing a defendant-spouse to hold the adverse spousal testimony privilege. Id. at 49-50.
126. Id. at 49-50.
127. Id. at 50-53; see also 8 WIGMORE, supra note 97, § 2228, at 221 (referring to the
privilege as "the merest anachronism in legal theory and an indefensible obstruction to truth
in practice"). Criticism of the adverse spousal testimony privilege continues unabated. See,
e.g., 1 KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 66 (John W. Strong ed., 5th
ed. 1999) (criticizing the adverse spousal testimony privilege as "an archaic survival of a
mystical religious dogma").
128. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 52.
129. Id.

130. Id. But see Gofman, supra note 98, at 855-60. Echoing the Court's prior reasoning
in Hawkins, Gofman argued that Trammel's reasoning is misguided because a marriage is
not necessarily beyond repair simply because one spouse is willing to testify against the
other and because even a disharmonious marriage deserves the protection of the privilege.
Id.; see also Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 77-78 (1958) (stating that "not all
marital flare-ups in which one spouse wants to hurt the other are permanent," but that a
court's decision to allow a witness-spouse to incriminate the defendant-spouse would cause
permanent damage).
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b. The MaritalCommunications Privilege

The second type of marital privilege is the marital communications
privilege. 131 A spouse may invoke the marital communications privilege
only to prevent the disclosure of information obtained from private
communications between spouses. 132 There are a few other differences
between this privilege and the adverse testimony privilege. First, because
the marital communications privilege bars a spouse's testimony only if it
pertains to a communication made by the party-spouse, it is narrower than
the adverse spousal testimony privilege. The latter bars the admission of
any adverse spousal testimony, even if the spouse's knowledge did not
133
result from a communication to him or her by the witness's spouse.
Second, unlike the adverse spousal testimony privilege, which is available
only in criminal cases, 134 the marital communications privilege applies in
13 5
both criminal and civil proceedings.
To invoke the privilege, three conditions must be met. 136 First, the
requested testimony must be in reference to "words or acts intended as
communications to the other spouse."' 13 7 Second, the spouse must have
communicated the information during a valid marriage, 138 although some
courts refuse to allow the privilege if the couple has irreconcilably
separated. 139 Finally, the parties must have intended the communications to
131. See, e.g., United States v. Darif, 446 F.3d 701, 705-07 (7th Cir. 2006). The
privilege is also known as the confidential communications privilege, see, e.g., United States
v. Knox, 124 F.3d 1360, 1365 (10th Cir. 1997), marital confidential communication
privilege, see, e.g., United States v. Bad Wound, 203 F.3d 1072, 1075 (8th Cir. 2000), or
confidential marital communications privilege, see, e.g., Trammel, 445 U.S. at 47.
132. See Trammel, 445 U.S. at 50-53.
133. Id. at51.
134. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
135. See United States v. 281 Syosset Woodbury Road, 71 F.3d 1067, 1072 (2d Cir.
1995); Smith v. United Salt Corp., No. 1:08CV00053, 2009 WL 2929343, at *7 (W.D. Va.
Sept. 9, 2009) (citing SEC v. Lavin, 111 F.3d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Ryan v. Comm'r, 568
F.2d 531, 544 (7th Cir. 1977); 3 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 103, §505.09); MUELLER
& KIRKPATRICK, supra note 39, § 5.32.
136. See, e.g., United States v. Marashi, 913 F.2d 724, 729-30 (9th Cir. 1990); Connor,
supra note 40, at 144-46.
137. Marashi, 913 F.2d at 729 (citations omitted); see, e.g., Pereira v. United States, 347
U.S. 1, 6 (1954) (asserting that the marital communications privilege generally extends only
to utterances and not to acts); United States v. Lefkowitz, 618 F.2d 1313, 1318 (9th Cir.
1980) (holding that a spouse's testimony that her estranged husband had submitted false
records to the Internal Revenue Service, when based on personal observations, is not a
"communication" for purposes of the marital communications privilege).
138. As with the adverse spousal testimony privilege, common-law marriages meet the
valid marriage requirement only if the jurisdiction where the couple resides recognizes such
marriages as valid. See Connor, supra note 40, at 144; see, e.g., United States v. Jarvison,
409 F.3d 1221, 1224-31 (10th Cir. 2005) (recognizing a valid marriage where a traditional
Navajo marriage ceremony had occurred and the couple had cohabitated and presented
themselves to society as husband and wife).
139. See United States v. Murphy, 65 F.3d 758, 761-62 (9th Cir. 1995) (denying the
privilege to a couple that had been separated for seven years and had filed for divorce);
United States v. Roberson, 859 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9th Cir. 1988) (instructing the district court
to determine whether a separated couple had "contemplated reconciliation or had abandoned
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be confidential. 140
Marital communications are presumed to be
confidential, but when a third party is witness to or likely to overhear a
communication between spouses, the communication is no longer
14
considered confidential. 1
Jurisdictions differ on the question of who holds the privilege. 142 The
federal common-law rule, followed by some states, 143 permits either spouse
to claim the privilege. 144 In other states, only the spouse who made the
45
communication holds the privilege. 1
Like the adverse spousal testimony privilege, the purpose of the marital
communications privilege is to preserve marital harmony. 14 6 The marital
communications privilege is more specific, however, in that it encourages
free communication between spouses and protects the privacy of
marriages. 14 7 The privilege recognizes a spouse's right to rely on marital
intimacy when communicating with his or her spouse. 148 While the adverse
spousal testimony privilege seeks in particular to protect the marriages of
all hope" at the time of a communication); United States v. Byrd, 750 F.2d 585, 592-94 (7th
Cir. 1984) ("[T]here is little societal interest in protecting the confidential relationship of
permanently separated couples."). But see In re Grand Jury Investigation of Hugle, 754 F.2d
863, 865 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that the marital communications privilege is available to "a
partner in an existing, albeit disharmonious, marriage").
140. See Connor, supra note 40, at 145.
141. Pereira, 347 U.S. at 6 (stating that the presumption of confidentiality may be
overcome by "the intention that the information conveyed be transmitted to a third person");
United States v. McCown, 711 F.2d 1441, 1452-53 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding that a
defendant's instruction to his wife to write a check to purchase a gun was not a confidential
communication because there was no indication that the defendant intended to keep the
request a secret from the couple's roommates); Lejkowitz, 618 F.2d at 1318 (holding that
"the presence of others destroys confidentiality and renders the privilege inapplicable").
142. See Frost, supra note 102, at 10.
143. See supra notes 51, 87 and accompanying text (explaining the distinction between
federal and state evidentiary common law).
144. See, e.g., United States v. Banks, 556 F.3d 967, 974 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing United
States v. Marashi, 913 F.2d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 1990)); State v. Beavers, 963 A.2d 956, 971
n.23 (Conn. 2009); State v. Taylor, 642 So. 2d 160, 164 (La. 1994) (citing State v. Bennett,
357 So. 2d 1136, 1139-40 (La. 1978)); Curran v. Pasek, 886 P.2d 272, 277 (Wyo. 1994)
(citing Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 1-12-104 (1994)).
145. See, e.g., KY. R. EVID. 504(b) ("An individual has a privilege to refuse to testify and
to prevent another from testifying to any confidential communication made by the individual
to his or her spouse during their marriage."); N.M. R. EVID. 11-505(B) ("A person has a
privilege in any proceeding to refuse to disclose and to prevent another from disclosing a
confidential communication by the person to that person's spouse while they were husband
and wife."); Ashford v. State, 807 A.2d 732, 766 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002) (citations
omitted).
146. See Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 14 (1934); Connor, supra note 40, at 142.
147. See Wolfle, 291 U.S. at 14 ("The basis of the immunity given to communications
between husband and wife is the protection of marital confidences, regarded as so essential
to the preservation of the marriage relationship as to outweigh the disadvantages to the
administration of justice which the privilege entails."); Connor, supra note 40, at 142-43.
148. See United States v. 281 Syosset Woodbury Road, 71 F.3d 1067, 1070 (2d Cir.
1995) (stating that the marital communications privilege seeks "'to protect the intimacy of
private marital communications' (quoting In re Grand Jury Subpoena United States, 755
F.2d 1022, 1027 (2d Cir. 1985), vacated on other grounds sub nom. United States v.
Koecher, 475 U.S. 133 (1986))).
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witness- and defendant-spouses at trial, the marital communications
privilege is more concerned with the right of all married people to confide
freely in their spouses. 149 So that a spouse must never fear that an exspouse may share the spouse's secrets in court upon the event of a
divorce, 150 the privilege may be invoked even after a marriage has
dissolved. 15 1
Perhaps because of the specificity of the marital
communications privilege, it has generally enjoyed a much 52 less
controversial reputation than the adverse spousal testimony privilege.1
4. Justifications for the Marital Privileges
Although the marital privileges themselves have evolved over the years,
the reasoning behind their existence has been relatively stable. Parts I.A.2
and I.A.3 briefly highlighted the aims of the two marital privileges, but this
section discusses additional policy considerations underlying the privileges,
of which there are three main types. 153 First, courts initially used the
marital privileges to exclude testimony seen as unreliable. 154 Second,
courts employ a utilitarian balancing test popularized by John Wigmore, the
logic of which applies to all privileges: a testimonial privilege should exist
only if the benefit of the privilege outweighs the harm caused by the loss of
evidence. 155 The final justification, limited to marital privileges, is that the
marital relationship is so unique and critical to society that it warrants
special protection. 156 The following sections discuss each in turn.

149. See Connor, supra note 40, at 142-43.
150. See United States v. Byrd, 750 F.2d 585, 590 (7th Cir. 1984) (explaining that the
marital communications privilege "exists to insure that spouses generally, prior to any
involvement in criminal activity or a trial, feel free to communicate their deepest feelings to
each other without fear of eventual exposure in a court of law").
151. See Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 6 (1954) (citing 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE,
WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2341(2) (3d ed. 1940); 58 AM. JuR. Witnesses § 379 (1948));
Aveson v. Kinnaird, 6 East 188, 192, 102 Eng. Rep. 1258, 1260 (K.B. 1805) (stating that the
marital communications privilege should exist even after a divorce because "the confidence
which subsisted between them at the time shall not be violated in consequence of any future
separation"), cited with approval in Stein v. Bowman, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 209, 221 (1839).
152. See Ryan v. Comm'r, 568 F.2d 531, 544 n.6 (7th Cir. 1977) (stating that the marital
communications privilege "has not been the target of the intense criticism which has been
leveled against the privilege against adverse spousal testimony"); id. (comparing
MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 66 (2d ed. 1972) (arguing that the adverse spousal testimony
privilege is based on "mystical religious dogma"), with id. §§ 78-86, at 126-33 (recognizing
the need for a qualified marital communications privilege)).
153. This three-part classification of rationales for privileges is drawn partially from an
unauthored student note. See Note, Developments in the Law-Privileged Communications,
98 HARV. L. REV. 1450, 1471-500 (1985) [hereinafter PrivilegedCommunications].
154. See infra Part I.A.4.a.
155. See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 97, § 2285, at 527; infra Part I.A.4.b.
156. See infra Part I.A.4.c.
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a. The Prevention of Perjury
One early aim of the marital privileges was to exclude the testimony of
unreliable witnesses. 157 This policy originated from the early common-law
doctrine of spousal incompetency, which evolved into the marital
privileges, as discussed above. 158 Although the basis for the rule of spousal
incompetency was the legal fiction of coverture, 159 the underlying purpose
in rejecting both spouses' testimony was to prevent the potentially
untruthful testimony of an "interested" witness who was invested in the
outcome of the proceedings.' 60 Even after courts had rejected the idea of
coverture, they continued to hold spouses incompetent to testify because
their testimony could be unreliable.161
The policy of barring a spouse's testimony to avoid unreliable witnesses
has since fallen out of favor. 162 Courts have rejected this reasoning on the
grounds that cross-examination guards against perjury and modem juries
can accurately judge a witness's credibility.16 3 The Supreme Court has also
reasoned that to allow a defendant to testify but prohibit his wife from
doing so is illogical because a defendant possesses an equal, if not greater,
motivation to lie on the stand. 164
b. Wigmore's Four-FactorBalancing Test
When determining whether a privilege protecting communications should
be available, 165 courts and scholars frequently cite John Wigmore, 166 who
157. See Clements v. Marston, 52 N.H. 31, 37 (1872) (stating that one reason for the
common-law doctrine of spousal incompetency was to deter spouses who might be tempted
to lie under oath to protect his or her spouse); supra note 91 and accompanying text.
158. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 43-44 (1980). But see Mullane, supra
note 52, at 122-30 (arguing that the rule of spousal incompetency did not evolve into the
adverse spousal testimony privilege and that the two are completely distinct).
159. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
160. See Lord Audley's Case, Hut. 115, 116, 123 Eng. Rep. 1140, 1141 (C.P. 1631).
161. See Clements, 52 N.H. at 37 (stating that the adverse spousal testimony privilege
serves the public good because it prevents witness-spouses from committing perjury to
protect their spouses); see also Mullane, supra note 52, at 126 (suggesting that a spouse in a
disintegrating marriage would be more likely to lie while testifying to hurt his or her spouse).
162. See, e.g., Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 381-82 (1933).
163. In eliminating the rule, the Supreme Court explained that the danger of an interested
witness telling convincing lies on the stand was virtually nonexistent due to jurors' ability to
judge a witness's credibility and judicial procedures like cross-examination. Id. at 380.
164. Id. at 381.
165. Because this theory justifies privileges protecting private conversations, this theory
is applicable only to the marital communications privilege. See supra notes 96, 106 and
accompanying text.
166. See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 97, § 2285, at 527-28; see, e.g., Jaffee v. Redmond, 518
U.S. 1, 10-15 (1996) (adopting a four-factor test similar to Wigmore's in deciding to
recognize a psychotherapist-patient privilege); ACLU v. Finch, 638 F.2d 1336, 1344 (5th
Cir. 1981) (describing Wigmore's "classic utilitarian formulation" as the standard to use
when weighing the value of a new privilege); Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 110004 (5th Cir. 1970) (utilizing Wigmore's four conditions to determine the availability of the
attomey-client privilege); Catherine B. Sarson, Note, The Child-Parent Testimonial

1780

FORDHAMLA WREVIEW

[Vol. 78

found the following four conditions necessary before courts should grant a
privilege:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not
be disclosed;
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and

satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties;
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community
ought to be sedulouslyfostered; and
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the
communications must be greater
than the benefit thereby gained for the
167
correct disposal of litigation.
Wigmore based these conditions on the premise that the main purpose of
privileges is to encourage open communication, which is necessary for the
formation and maintenance of socially beneficial relationships.' 68 The test,
however, ensures that courts strike the proper balance between admitting
and excluding testimony by instructing courts to recognize a privilege only
if the resulting social benefits outweigh the harm that results when useful
evidence is excluded from legal proceedings. 16 9 Part I.B discusses this
balancing test in detail.
c. The Preservationof Marriage Theory

The last of the three justifications for the privileges focuses on the
170
uniqueness of the marital relationship, which merits special protection.
Proponents of this theory argue that the marital privileges preserve
domestic harmony because, if one spouse were forced to testify against the
other, the marriage would be harmed beyond repair. 171 Even though the
absence of a privilege would ensure that all relevant evidence is admissible,
the legal system places more value in the preservation of the institution of

Privilege: Attempts at Codification Have Missed Their Mark, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 861,
864-65 (1999) (finding that the marital communications privilege fulfills all four of
Wigmore's conditions).
167. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 97, § 2285, at 527.
168. See Frost, supra note 102, at 15-16 (citing 8 WIGMORE, supra note 97, § 2285, at
527).
169. See id.
170. See, e.g., Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 44 (1980); In re Malfitano, 633
F.2d 276, 277-78 (3d Cir. 1980); United States v. Tsinnijinnie, 601 F.2d 1035, 1038 (9th
Cir. 1979); Ryan v. Comm'r, 568 F.2d 531, 543-45 (7th Cir. 1977); see also Sarson, supra
note 166, at 863 (asserting that "open and honest communication between husband and wife,
without imposing fear of compulsory disclosure of marital secrets," is valuable to society).
171. See Trammel, 445 U.S. at 44; Malfitano, 633 F.2d at 277-78; Ryan, 568 F.2d at 543
(citing the fear that forced spousal testimony destroys marriages); Clements v. Marston, 52
N.H. 31, 36 (1872) (explaining the view that "it was not expedient to place husband and wife
in a position that might lead to dissensions and strife between them"); Frost, supra note 102,
at 21-22.
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marriage, which the Supreme Court has called "the best solace of human
172
existence."
In a related argument, one scholar has classified this rationale as
essentially humanistic, suggesting it is "fundamentally indecent" for courts
to intrude upon the privacy of a couple's marriage. 173 Similarly, some
believe it is morally wrong and even cruel to compel a spouse to testify
adversely because it forces174the witness-spouse to be instrumental in the
demise of his or her spouse.
Related to the preservation of marriage theory is the public policy
focusing on the value our society places in personal privacy. 175 This theory
maintains that insulating marriages from public scrutiny allows for personal
autonomy, permits emotional release, encourages
self-evaluation, and
176
fosters the personal development of all citizens.
B. The Child Abuse Exception in the Federal Courts
Despite the fact that marital privileges have been a constant feature of
U.S. common law, courts have developed two exceptions to the privileges
when the importance in admitting a witness-spouse's testimony outweighs
the justifications detailed above. 177 The first exception eliminates the
marital privileges when the testimony relates to a crime committed by both
spouses. 178 The second exception, and the subject of this Note, eliminates
the privileges when the witness-spouse's testimony relates to a crime
committed against the witness-spouse or his or her child. 179 This section
outlines the two exceptions, analyzing the second in detail.
1. Exceptions to the Marital Privileges
Because privileges obstruct the justice system's search for truth, courts
have construed them particularly narrowly in criminal proceedings, where
society has a "strong interest in the administration of justice."' 180 One way
172. Stein v. Bowman, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 209, 223 (1839).
173. Cassidy, supra note 99, at 360 (citing RICHARD M. GULA, ETHICS IN PASTORAL
MINISTRY 120-21 (1996); Charles L. Black, Jr., The Marital and Physician Privileges-A
Reprint of a Letter to a Congressman, 1975 DUKE L.J. 45).
174. See 3 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 103, § 505.03 (stating that traditionally there
has been "a sense that civilized society should not compel a husband or wife to be the means
of the other spouse's conviction"); Cassidy, supra note 99, at 360-61 (citing Preliminary
Draft, supra note 59, at 264).
175. See Frost, supra note 102, at 24-25 (citing KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK
ON EVIDENCE § 86, at 201-03 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984)). See generally Robert
Weisberg & Michael Wald, Confidentiality Laws and State Efforts To Protect Abused or
Neglected Children: The Need for Statutory Reform, 18 FAM. L.Q. 143, 191-93 (1984)
(restating arguments that protecting personal privacy is a valuable goal unto itself).
176. See ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 32-37 (1967).
177. See supra Part I.A.3.
178. See infra note 185 and accompanying text.
179. See infra notes 185-214 and accompanying text.
180. United States v. Marashi, 913 F.2d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing United States v.
Roberson, 859 F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th Cir. 1988)).
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that courts construe privileges narrowly is by carving out exceptions to the
privileges when competing public policies prove more compelling than
those behind a privilege. 18 1 In the case of marital privileges, therefore,
courts have created exceptions when the need to ensure82that justice is served
outweighs the public policy underlying the privileges. 1
This balancing test has led to two commonly accepted exceptions to the
marital privileges in federal courts. 183 First, the marital communications
privilege-and, in some circuits, the adverse spousal testimony
privilege'84--does not apply during prosecutions of crimes in which both
spouses are participants. 185 The second exception, and the subject of this
Note, applies in criminal proceedings in which a defendant is charged with
the abuse of his or her spouse 186 or child. 187 The next section discusses this
exception in detail.
2. The Development of the Child Abuse Exception
The child abuse exception originates from a common-law exception to
the doctrine of spousal incompetency dictating that courts admit a witness181. See Connor, supra note 40, at 146-47; see, e.g., Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 8-9
(1996) (emphasizing that Rule 501 not only allows but directs courts to modify privileges
when necessary).
182. See, e.g., State v. Pelletier, 818 A.2d 292 (N.H. 2003). In State v. Pelletier,the New
Hampshire Supreme Court held that "[tihe marital privilege may, for reasons of public
policy, be appropriately limited ....
[We] will not cloak the sexual activity between a
husband and wife with the marital privilege when, as here, disclosure would provide relevant
information concerning the alleged sexual abuse of a child of one of the spouses who is
living with them." Id. at 298 (citing N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 161-F:48 (2003)).
183. See, e.g., United States v. Banks, 556 F.3d 967, 974 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Allery, 526 F.2d 1362, 1365 (8th Cir. 1975).
184. Compare United States v. Clark, 712 F.2d 299, 302 (7th Cir. 1983) ("[T]he public
interest in discouraging a criminal from enlisting the aid of his or her spouse as an
accomplice outweighs the interest in protecting the marriage."), with In re Grand Jury
Subpoena United States, 755 F.2d 1022, 1025-28 (2d Cir. 1985) (rejecting the joint
participants exception to the adverse spousal testimony privilege), and In re Malfitano, 633
F.2d 276, 278-80 (3d Cir. 1980).
185. See United States v. Darif, 446 F.3d 701, 705-07 (7th Cir. 2006); Marashi, 913 F.2d
at 730 (stating that every circuit addressing the issue has created the joint participants
exception to the marital communications privilege). See generally Amy G. Bermingham,
Partners in Crime: The Joint Participants Exception to the Privilege Against Adverse
Spousal Testimony, 53 FORDHAM L. REv. 1019 (1985). The Second Circuit has explained
the policy behind this exception as follows:
The [circuits] which recognize that 'partnership in crime' exception to the
confidential communication privilege believe that greater public good will
result from permitting the spouse of an accused to testify willingly concerning
their joint criminal activities than would come from permitting the accused to
erect a roadblock against the search for truth.
United States v. Estes, 793 F.2d 465, 468 (2d Cir. 1986).
186. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 46 n.7 (1980); Wyatt v. United States,
362 U.S. 525, 526-27 (1960).
187. See, e.g., United States v. Bahe, 128 F.3d 1440 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v.
White, 974 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Allery, 526 F.2d 1362 (8th Cir.
1975); United States v. Martinez, 44 F. Supp. 2d 835 (W.D. Tex. 1999); infra notes 312-33
and accompanying text. This Note refers to this exception as the child abuse exception.
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spouse's testimony in trials for a defendant's abuse of the witnessspouse. 188 For clarity, this Note refers to this exception as the spousal
abuse exception. After the rule of spousal incompetency was abrogated in
federal courts in 1933,189 the Supreme Court continued to apply the spousal
abuse exception to the adverse spousal testimony privilege. 190
Federal courts did not address the question of whether the spousal abuse
exception also applied in cases of a defendant's abuse of his or her child or
stepchild, however, until 1975 in United States v. Allery. 19 1 The defendant,
Fred Allery, appealed his conviction for the attempted rape of his twelveyear-old daughter. 192 His main argument on appeal was that the trial
court's admission of his wife's testimony against him violated the adverse
spousal testimony privilege. 193 Allery's wife testified at trial as to his
actions on the evening of the attempted rape and previous alleged sexual
misconduct with the prosecutrix and other minor female children in their
94

family. 1

At the time of Allery's appeal, federal courts recognized the "wellestablished" spousal abuse exception to the adverse spousal testimony
privilege, which allowed a witness-spouse's testimony when the defendant
had committed an offense against the witness-spouse. 195 In Allery, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit expanded that exception to include
"crimes done to a child of either spouse."' 196 The Allery court considered
the policy behind the privilege in its decision and listed five reasons for
97
expanding the exception.'
First, the court reasoned that a serious crime against a couple's child is an
offense against both family harmony, which the privilege purportedly
protects, and society. 198 To uphold the privilege in such cases, therefore,
would undermine the privilege's purpose. 199 Second, the court noted that
parental testimony is necessary in many prosecutions for child abuse
because child abuse is usually an intrahousehold crime.20 0 The Allery court
cited a statistic estimating that over 90% of reported child abuse occurred in
188. See Stein v. Bowman, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 209, 209 (1839) (citations omitted) (stating

that, although husbands and wives generally may not be witnesses for or against the other,
that rule does not apply when the husband commits a crime against his wife). This exception
can be traced back even further in English common law. See Lord Audley's Case, Hut. 115,
116, 123 Eng. Rep. 1140, 1141 (C.P. 1631), cited with approval in Trammel v. United
States, 445 U.S. at 46 n.7.
189. See Funk v.United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933).
190. See, e.g., Wyatt v. United States, 362 U.S. 525, 526-27 (1960) (approving the rule
followed, at that time, in five circuits).
191. 526 F.2d 1362.
192. Id. at 1363.
193. Id. at 1364.
194. Id. at 1363.
195. Id. at 1365.
196. Id. at 1367.
197. Id. at 1366-67.
198. Id. at 1366.
199. See id.
200. Id.
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the home, and in 87.1% of those cases, a parent or parent substitute was the
perpetrator. 20 1 In such intrahousehold abuse cases, the defendant's spouse
is likely to be the only adult witness with knowledge of the crime, so his or
her testimony is essential to the prosecution. 20 2 The third justification cited
by the Allery court for expanding the exception is that any "'rule that
impedes the discovery of truth in a court of law impedes as well the doing
of justice."' 203 Fourth, in its Rule 501 reason and experience analysis, the
court took into account the many state jurisdictions recognizing a child
abuse exception. 20 4 Finally, in the same vein as the previous justification,
the court found that in the prior
fifteen years, at least eleven states had
20 5
codified child abuse exceptions.
The Supreme Court later signaled its approval of Allery's constraint on
the marital privileges in cases of child abuse, 20 6 and other circuits have
continued to rely on Allery in their appraisals of the appropriate scope of
20 7
marital privileges.
3. Current Forms of the Child Abuse Exception
Because the Rules do not govern state court decisions, 20 8 states establish
their own evidentiary rules, including those regarding privileges. Among
the fifty-one jurisdictions with child abuse exceptions, 20 9 five basic forms
of the exception have emerged: (1) crimes against any child, regardless of
his or her relationship to the defendant; 210 (2) crimes against a spouse, a
201. Id. (citing Lloyd Leva Plaine, Comment, Evidentiary Problems in Criminal Child
Abuse Prosecution, 63 GEO. L.J. 257, 258 (1974)). Recent statistics focus on instances of
sexual abuse, but cite comparable figures. See Childhelp, National Child Abuse Statistics,
http://www.childhelp.org/resources/leaming-center/statistics (last visited Feb. 21, 2010)
(reporting that ninety percent of child sexual abuse victims know the perpetrator in some
way and sixty-eight percent are abused by family members).
202. See Allery, 526 F.2d at 1366; see also Damian P. Richard, Expanding the 'Child of
Either' Exception to the Husband-Wife Privilege Under the New M.R.E. 504(D), 60 A.F. L.
REv. 155, 169 (2007) (stating that there is "an immense need to admit all possible evidence
in child abuse cases" because typically there are few witnesses to the abuse).
203. Allery, 526 F.2d at 1366 (quoting Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 81 (1958)
(Stewart, J., concurring)).
204. Id. at 1366-67 (citing Balltrip v. People, 401 P.2d 259 (Colo. 1965); People v.
Miller, 168 N.W.2d 408 (Mich. 1969); State v. Kollenbom, 304 S.W.2d 855 (Mo. 1957);
Chamberlain v. State, 348 P.2d 280 (Wyo. 1960)).
205. Id. at 1367 (citations omitted) (citing eleven state statutes).
206. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 46 n.7 (1980) (citing Allery, 526 F.2d at
1362; 8 WIGMORE, supra note 97, § 2338) (stating that Allery's exception to the adverse
spousal testimony privilege has been found to apply to the marital communications privilege
as well).
207. See infra notes 312-33 and accompanying text.
208. See FED. R. EVID. 101.
209. All fifty states and Washington, D.C., have child abuse exceptions. See infra notes
210-14.
210. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-411(5) (West 2008) (holding that a spouse
may not invoke either marital privilege in any prosecution for a sex offense against a child);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b- 129a(3) (West 2009) (eliminating the marital communications
privilege in all child abuse cases); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-23 (West 1995) (stating that neither
marital privilege applies in cases of crimes against any minor child); IDAHO R. EVID.
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child of either spouse, or persons residing in the home; 2 11 (3) crimes against
a child of either spouse or a child in the care, custody, or control of either
504(d)(1) (eliminating the privileges in all child abuse cases); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-32-11-1
(LexisNexis Supp. 2007) (abrogating the marital communications privilege "in any judicial
proceeding resulting from a report of a child who may be a victim of child abuse or
neglect"); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:403(B) (2007) (stating that "[iun any proceeding
concerning the abuse or neglect or sexual abuse of a child or the cause of such condition,
evidence may not be excluded on any ground of privilege"); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD.
PROC. § 9-106(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2006) (eliminating the adverse spousal testimony
privilege-but not the marital communications privilege-when the charges involve "[tihe
abuse of a child under 18"); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2162(3)(c) (West Supp. 2009)
(eliminating only the adverse spousal testimony privilege in "a prosecution for a crime
committed against a child of either or both or a crime committed against an individual who is
younger than 18 years of age"); Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-1-5 (West 1999) (providing that the
adverse spousal testimony privilege is inapplicable in a prosecution "for a criminal act
against any child"); Miss. R. EviD. 504(d)(1) (eliminating the marital communications
privilege when the defendant has committed a crime against "the person of any minor
child"); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 546.260 (West 2009) (stating that neither the adverse spousal
testimony privilege nor the marital communications privilege may be invoked "in any
criminal prosecution ... involving an alleged victim under the age of eighteen"); N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 169-C:32 (LexisNexis 2001) (providing that the marital privileges do not apply
in cases of child abuse); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-30 (Supp. 2009) (establishing an exception
to the marital communications privilege in cases of "child abuse or neglect, the death of a
child, criminal sexual conduct involving a minor, or the commission or attempt to commit a
lewd act upon a minor"); TEX. R. EVID. 504 (barring invocation of the marital
communications privilege and adverse spousal testimony privilege in proceedings where the
spouse is accused of a crime against "the spouse, any minor child, or any member of the
household of either spouse"); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-271.2 (2008) (eliminating the adverse
spousal testimony and marital communications privileges in prosecutions for physical or
sexual abuse of a minor); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-210 (2009) (eliminating the marital
communications privilege-but not the adverse spousal testimony privilege-in all child
abuse cases); State v. Anderson, 636 N.W.2d 26, 33-34 (Iowa 2001) (explaining that Iowa
Code sections 232.69(2) and 232.74 prevent the application of the marital communications
privileges in cases related to reports of suspected child abuse by a "person responsible for
the care of the child"); Villalta v. Commonwealth, 702 N.E.2d 1148, 1152 (Mass. 1998)
(interpreting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 20 (1996) as eliminating both marital privileges in
proceedings involving the abuse of any child). But see State v. Taylor, 642 So. 2d 160, 16566 (La. 1994) (explaining that Louisiana has not adopted any exceptions to the adverse
spousal testimony privilege because the privilege may not be exercised by the defendant).
211. See, e.g., ALA. R. EvID. 504(d)(3) and advisory committee's note (stating that the
word "child" is not limited to a natural child of the spouses for purposes of the exception to
the marital communications privilege); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-41-101 (1999) (adopting this
exception to the marital communications privilege); DEL. R. EVID. 504(d); HAW. R. EvID.
505(c)(1) (eliminating both privileges in these instances); Ky. R. EVID. 504 (applying the
exception to both privileges and providing that "[tlhe court may refuse to allow the privilege
in any proceeding if the interests of the minor child of either spouse may be adversely
affected"); ME. R. EvID. 504(d); N.D. R. EVID. 504(d); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2504(D)
(West 2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-13-15 (1995) (establishing this exception for the
marital communications privilege); UTAH R. EVID. 502(b)(4)(C)(ii) (creating this exception
for the marital communications privilege); VT. R. EVID. 504(d); Munson v. State, 959
S.W.2d 391, 392-93 (Ark. 1998) (holding that a fourteen-year-old child who was visiting the
defendant's home when he sexually assaulted her "resided" in the home, triggering the child
abuse exception as codified in ARK. R. EVID. 504(d)(3)).
Uniform Rule of Evidence 504(d) is the basis for this form of the child abuse
exception. See UNIF. R. EVID. 504(d), 13C U.L.A. 427-29 (2004). The proposed Federal
Rules of Evidence were the basis for the 1974 revision of the Uniform Rules of Evidence,
which a number of states subsequently adopted. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note
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spouse; 2 12

(4) crimes against the witness-spouse or either spouse's child 2or
14
relative; 2 13 and (5) crimes against a spouse or a child of either spouse.
39, § 5.6, at 321 n.18. For the full annotated text of the 1974 Uniform Rules of Evidence,
see 13A-F U.L.A. (2004).
212. See, e.g., 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/115-16 (West 2008) (establishing that a
spouse may testify to confidential communications in cases where a spouse is "charged with
an offense against the person or property of the other ... when the interests of their child or
children or of any child or children in either spouse's care, custody, or control are directly
involved"); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(l)(a) (West 2000) (establishing that there is no
confidential communication privilege in a "criminal action or proceeding for a crime
committed by one against the other or against a child of either or against a child under the
care of either spouse"); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49.295(2)(e)(1) (LexisNexis 2006) (holding
there are no marital privileges in a criminal proceeding in which one spouse is charged with
a "crime against the person or the property of the other spouse or of a child of either, or of a
child in the custody or control of either, whether the crime was committed before or during
marriage"); N.J. R. EVID. 501, 509 (eliminating both marital privileges in cases where the
crime is "against the spouse, a child of the accused or of the spouse, or a child to whom the
accused or the spouse stands in the place of a parent"); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1046(a)(vii)
(McKinney 2007) (eliminating the confidential communications in proceedings for child
abuse or neglect); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-57(b)(5)-(c) (2007) (specifying that there shall be no
adverse spousal testimony privilege "in a prosecution of one spouse for any other criminal
offense against the minor child of either spouse, including any illegitimate or adopted or
foster child of either spouse," but that the marital communications privilege remains intact);
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5913(2) (West 2000) (establishing that there is no adverse
spousal testimony privilege "in any criminal proceeding against either [spouse] for bodily
injury or violence attempted, done or threatened upon the other, or upon the minor children
of said husband and wife, or the minor children of either of them, or any minor child in their
care or custody, or in the care or custody of either of them"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-201
(2000) (stating that the marital communications privilege "shall not apply to proceedings...
concerning abuse of ... a minor in the custody of or under the dominion and control of
either spouse"); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.060(1) (West 2009) (eliminating both
privileges in proceedings related to a defendant's abuse of "any child of whom said spouse
or domestic partner is the parent or guardian"); Commonwealth v. Spetzer, 813 A.2d 707,
720 (Pa. 2002) (interpreting 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5914 to mean that communications
from one spouse to another about child abuse will not be considered confidential).
213. CAL. EVID. CODE § 972(e)(1) (West 2009) (eliminating the adverse spousal
testimony privilege when the defendant-spouse is charged with a crime against the witnessspouse or "a child, parent, relative, or cohabitant of either"); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-3-3
(LexisNexis 2005) (creating an exception to the adverse spousal testimony privilege "in the
case of a prosecution for an offense committed by one against the other, or against the child,
father, mother, sister or brother of either of them").
214. See, e.g., ALASKA R. EVID. 505(a)(2)(D)(i), (b)(2)(A) (establishing the exception for
both the adverse spousal testimony privilege and the marital communications privilege);
CAL. EVID. CODE § 985(a) (West 2009) (codifying the exception to the marital
communications privilege); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.504(3)(b) (West 1999) (establishing that
there is no husband-wife privilege when a spouse is charged with a crime against the other
spouse or a child of either); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-428(b)(3) (1994) (establishing exceptions
to the marital communications privilege "in a criminal action in which one of them is
charged with a crime against the person or property of the other or of a child of either");
MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-802 (2009) ("The privilege does not apply to a civil action or
proceeding by one spouse against the other or to a criminal action or proceeding for a crime
committed by one spouse against the other or against a child of either spouse."); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 27-505(3)(a) (2008) (creating an exception to the marital communications privilege
when a crime is committed against a "child of either"); N.M. R. EViD. 11-505(D) (holding
that there is no marital privilege "in proceedings in which one spouse is charged with a crime
against the person or property of the other spouse or a child of either"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 857(b)(5) (2007) (ordering that a spouse may be compelled to testify in "a prosecution of one
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Although these forms of the exception overlap, each is conceptually
distinct. Part II of this Note discusses in detail the various forms of the
child abuse exception adopted in federal courts.
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: THE INCONSISTENT ADOPTION AND APPLICATION
OF CHILD ABUSE EXCEPTIONS IN FEDERAL COURTS

Like the states, federal courts differ in their treatment of the child abuse
exception to the marital privileges. This part uses the 2009 case United
States v. Banks2 15 to revisit the various forms of the child abuse exception.
This section first describes the Banks decision in detail, then reviews the
child abuse exceptions adopted in other circuits and in military courts,
providing scholarly support for the forms of the child abuse exception
adopted by the courts.
A. Forms of the ChildAbuse Exception Limited to Victims Related to the
Defendant
1. The Most Recent Treatment of the Child Abuse Exception in Federal
Courts: The Ninth Circuit's Narrow Child Abuse Exception
The recent Ninth Circuit decision United States v. Banks illustrates the
struggle federal courts have faced in attempting to strike the proper balance
between the public policy behind the well-established (yet heavily
criticized) 2 16 marital privileges and the importance of prosecuting child
abusers in the most effective way possible.
The FBI launched an investigation into Jerry Levis Banks's activity in an
Internet chat room called "Kid Sex and Incest" after a Canadian child
pornographer, cooperating with the Canadian government, told authorities
of Banks's illegal activity. 21 7 The FBI's execution of a search warrant at
Banks's house led to the discovery of evidence of child pornography and
spouse for any other criminal offense against the minor child of either spouse, including any
illegitimate or adopted or foster child of either spouse"); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.42
(LexisNexis 2006) (codifying an exception to the marital communications privilege in the
case of an offense against the spouse for cruelty to their children); OR. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 40.255(4)(a) (West 2003) (denoting that there is no marital privilege in criminal actions
when a spouse is charged with an "offense or attempted offense against the person or
property of the other spouse or of a child of either"); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-17-10.1 (2002)
(stating that a spouse may be ordered to testify against his or her spouse in cases of abuse
against the spouse or a child of either); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 905.05(3)(b) (West 2000)
(eliminating the marital communications privilege when a spouse is charged "with a crime
against the person or property of the other or of a child of either"); Johnson v. United States,
616 A.2d 1216, 1224 (D.C. 1992) (interpreting D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-306(b) (LexisNexis
1991)). But see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-57(c) (2007) (stating that there are no exceptions to the
marital communications privilege).

215. United States v. Banks, 556 F.3d 967 (9th Cir. 2009).
216. See infra Part II.B.2.
217. See United States v. Banks, No. 1:06-cr-00051-BLW-WBS, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
82368, at * 1-2 (D. Idaho Oct. 27, 2006) (order denying motion to suppress), af'd, 556 F.3d
967 (9th Cir. 2009); FBI Press Release, supra note 4.
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the seizure of Banks's computer equipment. 2 18 As a result, the FBI arrested
Banks and the government charged him with nine counts of possessing,
2 19
producing, transporting, and receiving child pornography.
Seven of the counts proceeded to trial in the District of Idaho, where
Judge William B. Shubb of the Eastern District of California 220 held a
bench trial. 221 At trial, the primary issue was whether Banks had created a
video sent to the Canadian child pornographer. 222 The video depicted a
young child having his diaper changed,2 23 but only the hands and arms of
the person changing the diaper were visible. 224 To identify Banks and his
grandchild as the individuals in the video, the government called Banks's
wife, Kathryn Banks, as a witness. 22 5 Kathryn testified that the child
depicted was her grandson and identified her husband's ring, watch, and
226
couch in the video.
The prosecutor then asked her whether her husband had said anything to
her about a video involving their grandson. 227 Banks objected, arguing that
228
such information was protected by the marital communications privilege.
Up until that point, United States v.

White2 29 was the controlling

precedent regarding exceptions to the marital communications privilege in
the Ninth Circuit. 2 30 In White, the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California convicted defendant Joseph Lamont White of
218. Banks, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82368, at *3.
219. See Banks, 556 F.3d at 971; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (2006) (prohibiting child
pornography).
220. Judge William B. Shubb was sitting in the District of Idaho. DOJ Press Release,
supra note 4.
221. See Banks, 556 F.3d at 971; Waiver of Trial by Jury and Waiver of Special Findings
of Facts, supra note 13, at 1.
222. Banks, 556 F.3d at 971.
223. Id. at 979. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit described the contents of
the videos as follows:
Using a diaper wipe, Banks touched, rubbed and held the child's penis.
Banks also massaged the child's scrotum and anus, and the time spent
wiping the child's anus appears prolonged. These actions were taken at a
point in the diaper-changing where it could reasonably be concluded that
they were extraneous. Indeed, after the cleaning process appeared complete,
Banks exited the screen and returned two more times with new wipes and
continued touching the child. In addition, messages between Banks and the
Canadian pedophile demonstrated that Banks represented the video as
depicting the child's erection.
Id.
224. See Appellant's Reply Brief at 16, Banks, 556 F.3d 967 (9th Cir. 2009) (No. 0730130), 2008 WL 937157, at *16.
225. Id. at 17; see also Banks, 556 F.3d at 971.
226. Banks, 556 F.3d at 971.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 971, 974. Because only the witness-spouse holds the adverse spousal
testimony privilege, see supra note 118 and accompanying text, and Kathryn Banks testified
voluntarily, choosing not to invoke the privilege, Jerry Banks was only able to invoke the
marital communications privilege, held by both spouses. See supra note 144 and
accompanying text.
229. 974 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 1992).
230. See Banks, 556 F.3d at 974.
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involuntary manslaughter after his two-year-old stepdaughter, Jasmine, died
from severe head injuries she incurred while in White's care. 23 1 Over
White's objection, the district court allowed his wife, Jayne, to testify at
trial that during a fight regarding White's role as caretaker of Jayne's
children, White told Jayne that if she left Jasmine in his care again, he
would kill both Jayne and Jasmine. 232 The district court held that the
2 33
marital communications privilege invoked by White was unavailable.
On appeal, relying on United States v. Allery 2 34 and United States v.

Marashi,235 the Ninth Circuit held that a defendant's threats against the
witness-spouse and her child do not further the purpose of the marital
communications privilege, so the district court properly rejected White's
invocation of the privilege. 2 36 In so holding, the White court established a
child abuse exception that eliminated the marital communications privilege
when the statements at issue related to the abuse of a spouse or a spouse's
child.

23 7

The Banks district court, following White, also used the Allery balancing
test to weigh the public policy behind the privilege-strengthening
marriages-against the policy behind the exception-effectively
prosecuting defendants who abuse their children. 238 The district court
reasoned that although the child abuse exception created in White only
protected a witness-spouse and the witness-spouse's children, public policy
mandated that the exception also apply when the minor victim shared the
equivalent of a parent-child relationship with the defendant or witnessspouse. 239 Based on the facts of the case, the district court concluded that
the Bankses' relationship with their grandchild was equivalent to a parentthe marital
child relationship and prohibited Banks from invoking
240
communications privilege to prevent his wife's testimony.

231. White, 974F.2dat 1137.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. United States v. Allery, 526 F.2d 1362 (8th Cir. 1975), held that the adverse spousal
testimony privilege should not apply when public policy supporting the admission of the
testimony is deemed more important than the policy of protecting the spouses' marriage. See
id. at 1366-67; supra notes 191-207 and accompanying text (discussing Allery's reasoning).
In relying on Allery, the White court followed the Supreme Court's suggestion in Trammel
that Allery's reasoning could support an exception to the marital communications privilege
as well as the adverse spousal testimony privilege. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S.
40, 46 n.7 (1980); White. 974 F.2d at 1138.
235. 913 F.2d 724, 731 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the marital communications
privilege does not apply to a spouse's statements furthering joint criminal activity because
the public policy of effectively prosecuting criminals outweighs the policies underlying the
privilege).
236. White, 974 F.2d at 1138.
237. Id.
238. See United States v. Banks, 556 F.3d 967, 994 (9th Cir. 2009) (Alarc6n, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Transcript of Record at 501-02, United
States v. Banks, No. 1:06-cr-00051-BLW-WBS (D. Idaho July 16, 2007)).
239. Id. at 974 (majority opinion).
240. Id. at 975-76.
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After the district court overruled Banks's objection, Kathryn Banks
testified that her husband had told her that he made the video, 24 1 explaining
that he had done so to assure her that "'nothing went on in changing the
diaper because of past things."' 242 "Past things" referred to Jerry Banks's
of his and Kathryn
conviction and imprisonment for his sexual abuse
24 3
Banks's son, who was eleven years old at the time.
At the end of a six-day bench trial, 244 the district court concluded that
Banks had created the video at issue and found him guilty on all seven
counts. 245 On April 16, 2007, Banks was sentenced to life in prison plus
24 6
sixty years.
On appeal, Banks alleged that, because the Bankses' grandson was not
the child of Banks or his wife, the district court committed reversible error
in deciding that the grandson fell under the child abuse exception. 247 Banks
asserted that the district court "went far beyond" the scope of the White
exception when it applied the exception at Banks's trial 248 and refused to
allow Banks to invoke the marital communications privilege. 249 In Banks's
view, the district court was "really stretching" to find that the relationship
between the Bankses and their grandchild was so substantial that it deserved
the same protection as a parent-child relationship. 250 Using the district
court's reasoning, Banks contended, the child abuse exception would engulf
the privilege. 25 1 Banks contended that the error was not harmless because
Mrs. Banks's statement, which mentioned "past things," forced Banks to
explain that his wife was referring to Banks's prior sexual abuse of the
couple's minor son, information that Banks otherwise would not have
252
revealed to the district court.
241. Id. at 971.
242. Id.
243. See id. at 982 (Alarc6n, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing
Transcript of Record, supra note 238, at 371; Indictment, Banks, No. 1:06-cr-0005 1-BLWWBS); Appellant's Reply Brief, supra note 224, at 23-24 (citing Transcript of Record, supra
note 238, at 1148-49); FBI Press Release, supra note 4.
244. See Banks, 556 F.3d at 971.
245. Judgment, supra note 14, at 1.
246. Id. at 2 (sentencing Banks to life for the count of producing child pornography and
sixty years for one count each of possessing, receiving, and transporting child pornography);
FBI Press Release, supra note 4. As a registered sex offender, Banks faced a mandatory life
sentence for producing child pornography. See 18 U.S.C. § 3559(e) (2006); see also FBI
Press Release, supra note 4.
247. Appellant's Reply Brief, supra note 224, at 17-21. Banks's appeal related only to
his wife's testimony about statements he made to her. See id. Banks also appealed the
district court's denial of his motion to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to the search
warrant, id. at 5-16, and the district court's definitions of "masturbation" and "lascivious,"
id. at 25-29. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court on those two grounds. Banks, 556
F.3d at 980.
248. Appellant's Reply Brief, supra note 224, at 19.
249. Banks, 556 F.3d at 970-71.
250. Appellant's Reply Brief, supra note 224, at 18 (stating that the Bankses' contact
with their grandchild was "very infrequent").
251. Id. at 19.
252. Id. at 23-24.
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The government responded that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in extending the Ninth Circuit's child abuse exception to cases
where the victim was the witness-spouse's grandchild. 253 The government
cited United States v. Bahe,254 a case in which the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit extended the child abuse exception to include cases of
abuse of any child in the household. 2 55 The government also relied upon
United States v. Griffin256 for the principle that comity requires federal
courts to apply state law when determining issues of privilege. 257 Based on
Griffin, the government argued that because Idaho state law extended the
child abuse exception to cases of abuse of any child, 258 the district court
259
should have admitted Kathryn Banks's testimony in federal court as well.
Writing for the majority, Judge Johnnie B. Rawlinson approved of the
district court's ruling that even the abuse of the "functional equivalent[s]"
of birth or stepchildren should trigger the child abuse exception because
those children deserve the same protection. 260 The court found the rationale
of Allery helpful, using its balancing test to compare the importance of the
privilege with the value of spousal testimony in cases of child abuse when
the victim was not the biological or stepchild of the spouses. 26 1 The Ninth
Circuit explained that, because "the bond between marital partners and the
functional equivalent of their children would be nearly identical to that
between marital partners and their birth or stepchildren, the harm to family
' '262
harmony and society would be the equivalent of that noted in Allery.
The court concluded, therefore, that the functional equivalent deserves the
same protection given to a birth or stepchild and agreed to extend the
exception to apply when 263
a defendant abused the functional equivalent of his
or her child or stepchild.
The court supported its stance by citing, in addition to Allery, the current
state of the child abuse exception in both the federal and state court
systems, stating that seven of the nine states within the Ninth Circuit
recognized a child abuse exception including the functional equivalent of

253. Id. at 18-19.
254. 128 F.3d 1440 (10th Cir. 1997).
255. Id. at 1446.
256. 440 F.3d 1138 (9th Cir. 2006).
257. Appellant's Reply Brief, supra note 224, at 20.
258. See IDAHO R. EvID. 504(d)(1) (eliminating the marital privileges in all child abuse
cases).
259. Appellant's Reply Brief, supra note 224, at 19-20. In his reply brief, Banks
contended that the government misinterpreted United States v. Griffin. Id. at 20-21
(distinguishing Griffin because that case involved a defendant in prison who lost his right to
the marital privilege because of his imprisonment and arguing that the application of Idaho
law in Banks was a "vast departure" from Ninth Circuit law, which Griffin specifically
warned against).
260. United States v. Banks, 556 F.3d 967, 974-75 (9th Cir. 2009).
261. Id. at 974.
262. Id. at 975.
263. Id.
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birth children or a somewhat broader concept. 264 The court, however,
declined to expand the exception beyond that point, not persuaded that
every minor child in the household merited
the same protection as the
265
functional equivalent of a spouse's child.
The majority maintained that it was resolving Banks on the case-by-case
basis recommended by Allery's interpretation of Rule 501266 and that to
make "a sweeping ruling that the marital privilege is waived for all
grandparents for all time for all circumstances" 267-- as the majority viewed
the dissent's position26 8-would be inappropriate. 269 Under the facts of
Banks, the court decided that the district court had erred in deciding that the
Bankses' grandson was the "functional equivalent" of their child and should
270
have permitted Banks to invoke the marital communications privilege.
The majority recognized "the abhorrent nature of child sexual abuse," but
considered their analysis highly fact based and saw their reversal of the
2 71
district court as a simple difference of opinion.
The majority held that the district court abused its discretion in admitting
Kathryn Banks's testimony, 2 72 but found the error to be harmless due to the
substantial amount of evidence corroborating the district court's holding
that Banks made the video.2 73 Banks's conviction, therefore, was
upheld.274
264. Id. Those states include Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Nevada, and
Washington. Id. at 975 n.2.
265. Id. at 975 n.3. The court quickly disposed of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit's expansion of the exception to include testimony related to the abuse of any minor
child in the household, stating, "No . . . circuit [other than the Tenth Circuit] has adopted
such a broad exemption to the federal marital communications privilege. In fact, such an
exception would be broader than that adopted by the majority of states within the Ninth
Circuit." Id.
266. See United States v. Allery, 526 F.2d 1362, 1366 (8th Cir. 1975) (reviewing the
legislative history behind Congress's rejection of codified testimonial privileges and
concluding that Congress wished any changes to the common-law privileges to be enacted
by courts on a case-by-case basis).
267. Banks, 556 F.3d at 977.
268. See infra notes 275-88 and accompanying text (discussing the dissenting opinion).
269. Banks, 556 F.3d at 977. But see Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 53 (1980)
(vesting the adverse spousal testimony privilege in the witness-spouse only, despite
precedent to the contrary); Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 379 (1933) (overturning the
rule of spousal incompetency and rejecting the notion that courts are powerless to reject
outdated precedent); Benson v. United States, 146 U.S. 325, 337 (1892) (revising the rule
rendering codefendants incompetent to testify because of a widespread trend among the
states of repealing incompetency laws).
270. Banks, 556 F.3d at 976. The majority wrote that, while the Bankses and their
grandson enjoyed a strong grandchild-grandparent relationship that was beneficial to society,
it did not create the "overriding policy concerns" that would merit an exception to the
marital communications privilege. Id.
271. See id. at 977 (stating, of the district court's analysis, "In this particular case, under
these particular facts, we disagree").
272. Id. at 978.
273. Id. at 977-78. The majority found no evidence of prejudice because "the district
court's finding that Banks created the video made no mention of Banks's confession to his
wife." Id. at 977. Instead, the court focused on the government's other evidence, including
Kathryn Banks's unprivileged testimony that identified a watch, ring, and couch in the video
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Judge Arthur L. Alarc6n vehemently dissented to the majority's refusal
to extend the child abuse exception to the Bankses' grandson. 275 First, he
argued that United States v. White was not controlling because the White
court had addressed only the narrow question of whether the district court
had abused its discretion in admitting White's wife's testimony that White
had threatened to kill her and her daughter. 2 76 In answering this question,
Judge Alarc6n maintained, the White court viewed the pivotal issue as
"whether or not the conduct is 'inconsistent with the purposes of the marital
communications privilege:
promoting confidential communications
between spouses in order to foster marital harmony."' 2 77 Using that logic
in Banks, Judge Alarc6n argued, Kathryn Banks's testimony should have
been admitted because Banks's confession to his wife-that he had
videotaped himself changing their grandson's diaper and sent it to
pedophiles-"would destroy the harmonious relationship of marital
partners," regardless of whether evidence of that conversation was later
admitted at trial. 278 According to Judge Alarc6n, Banks's confession to his
wife would have been especially distressing because in 1990 the defendant
had pled guilty to sexually abusing their eleven-year-old son, who was now
the father of the grandchild in the video. 279 Following Judge Alarc6n's
interpretation of White, the court's interest in protecting the Bankses'
marriage could not outweigh its interest in administering justice for Banks's
crime of sexually abusing his grandchild because the couple's marriage did
280
not benefit from the defendant confiding in his spouse.
In addition to the public policy at issue in Banks, Judge Alarc6n hotly
contested the majority's application of Rule 501, arguing that it did not give
enough weight to state law, much of which provides for broad child abuse
exceptions. 28 1 Judge Alarc6n argued that the interpretation of a law in light
of reason and experience, as Rule 501 instructs, includes an analysis of the

as belonging to her husband, id., and the testimony of witnesses that "Banks had been left
alone with the child, that he had been discovered with the child in the locked garage, and that
he had admitted to changing the child's diaper." Id. at 971 n. 1.
274. Id. at 980.
275. Id. at 980-95 (Alarc6n, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
276. Id. at 981 (citing United States v. White, 974 F.2d 1135, 1137 (9th Cir. 1992)). To
Judge Alarc6n, the White court's holding was limited to the following: "[A] trial court can
properly balance the admission of the voluntary testimony of a spouse, regarding the threats
by the accused to harm a stepchild, against the privilege that communications between
spouses should be treated as confidential and inadmissible in a criminal proceeding to
maintain marital harmony." Id. at 982.
277. Id. (quoting White, 974 F.2d at 1138); cf Ryan v. Comm'r, 568 F.2d 531, 543 (7th
Cir. 1977) ("In making the case-by-case determination, it is helpful to weigh the need for
truth against the importance of the relationship or policy sought to be furthered by the
privilege, and the likelihood that recognition of the privilege will in fact protect that
relationship in the factual setting of the ease." (citing United States v. King, 73 F.R.D. 103,
105 (E.D.N.Y. 1976))).
278. See Banks, 556 F.3d at 982 (Alarc6n, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
279. Id. (citation omitted); FBI Press Release, supra note 4.
280. See Banks, 556 F.3d at 982 (Alarc6n, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
281. Id. at 982-85; see also supra notes 209-14 and accompanying text.

1794

FORDHAM LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 78

child abuse exception not only in federal case law, but also in the case law
and statutes of Idaho and other states. 28 2 Stressing that Congress, in
enacting Rule 501, intended to "'provide the [federal] courts with the
flexibility to develop rules of privilege on a case-by-case basis,"' 28 3 Judge
Alarc6n charged the majority with failing to consult state law in deciding
284
not to expand the child abuse exception.
Judge Alarc6n then presented a thorough survey of the child abuse
exception in federal courts and in those state courts that have not limited
their child abuse exceptions to children of the defendant or his or her
spouse, highlighting the policy behind each decision. 2 85 Judge Alarc6n also
laid out the various forms of the child abuse exceptions to the marital
communications privilege that state legislatures have codified. 286 Judge
Alarc6n criticized the majority for failing to explain its decision not to
follow the numerous states-and especially the four in the Ninth Circuitthat have adopted broad child abuse exceptions for prosecutions for crimes
287
against any child.

Judge Alarc6n concluded that the district court had conducted a proper
Rule 501 analysis, had balanced the policies behind the privilege and
society's competing interest in prosecuting child molesters, and had
correctly used those factors to admit Kathryn Banks's testimony under the
288
child abuse exception to the marital communications privilege.
2. Additional Sources Supporting the Ninth Circuit's Interpretation
In refusing to expand the child abuse exception to apply when a
defendant abuses a grandchild, the Banks majority's holding is consistent
with the Eighth Circuit's decision in United States v. Allery.289 Since
282. Banks, 556 F.3d at 984-85 (Alarc6n, J.,concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Judge Alarc6n found it "indisputable that Congress endorsed inclusion of state law" in its
direction of federal courts in Rule 501. Id. at 984 (citing Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 8
(1996)); see Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 13 ("[lIt is appropriate to treat a consistent body of policy
determinations by state legislatures as reflecting both 'reason' and 'experience."').
283. Banks, 556 F.3d at 984 (Alarc6n, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980)).
284. See id. at 985. The majority addressed Judge Alarc6n's objections in its opinion,
explaining that, although Rule 501 allows federal courts to look to the privileges created by
states if they wish, the Rule's emphasis is on federal common law. Id. at 976 (majority
opinion). If a court chooses to ignore state law and place greater value on its precedents,
therefore, it may. Id.
285. Id. at 986-91 (Alarc6n, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (describing
cases in Arkansas, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Texas, and Washington in which the courts adopted broad child abuse exceptions).
286. Id. at 991-94 (dividing the forms of the exception into two categories: the exception
that eliminates the marital communications privilege in cases of abuse of any child, codified
in twenty-six jurisdictions, and the exception that eliminates the privilege when the
defendant has committed a crime against a child in the care or custody of either spouse or
against a person residing in the home of either spouse, codified in thirteen jurisdictions).
287. Id. at 993.
288. See id. at 995.
289. See generally supra notes 191-207 and accompanying text.
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Allery, the first federal case to recognize a child abuse exception, the Eighth
Circuit has not revisited the issue. Now that other federal courts have relied
upon Allery in crafting broader versions of the child abuse exception, 90 the
Eighth Circuit has become1 the most conservative of all the circuits that have
29
child abuse exceptions.
The Banks majority opinion also follows the exceptions codified in both
proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 505,292 which provided for a child
abuse exception applying only in cases of abuse of a child of the defendant
or the witness-spouse, 293 and Uniform Rule of Evidence 504,294 which
provides a slightly broader child abuse exception eliminating the privilege
for crimes against a minor child or stepchild of the defendant as well as
crimes committed against an individual residing in the couple's
household. 295 Because the proposed Rules resulted from years of research
by respected members of the legal community, 296 most courts regard the
recommendations of the Advisory Committee and the Supreme Court as a
useful guide for Rule 501 analyses despite the fact that Congress declined
297
to adopt the proposed rules.
290. See infra Part II.B.2.
291. See United States v. Allery, 526 F.2d 1362 (8th Cir. 1975) (prohibiting the
invocation of the adverse spousal testimony privilege only when the witness-spouse or his or
her child or stepchild was the victim of the defendant's crime).
292. See Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183,
244-45 (1972).
293. See id. Proposed Rule 505 codifies the adverse spousal testimony privilege and, by
not specifically codifying it, eliminates the marital communications privilege. Id. Proposed
Rule 505 provides three exceptions, one of which applies when the defendant is on trial for
the abuse of his or her spouse or a child of either spouse. Id.
294. See UNIF. R. EvtD. 504(d), 13A U.L.A. 95-96 (2004); supra note 211 and
accompanying text.
295. See UNIF. R. EVID. 504(d), 13A U.L.A. 95-96 ("Exceptions. There is no privilege
under this rule . . . in any proceeding in which one spouse is charged with a crime or tort
against the person or property of the other, a minor child of either, an individual residing in
the household of either, or a third person if the crime or tort is committed in the course of
committing a crime or tort [against any of the individuals previously named in this
sentence]."). But see supra note 211 and accompanying text (describing courts' flexibility
when determining if an individual resides in a household for purposes of rules of evidence
containing this language).
296. See supra note 53 (listing members of the Advisory Committee responsible for
promulgating the Federal Rules of Evidence).
297. See 2 SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 87, § 501.02[3], at 501-11 (stating that the
proposed rules are a "useful reference point" because they were carefully developed by a
skilled advisory committee, were adopted by the Supreme Court, and for the most part,
simply restated current federal common law (citing In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d
374, 380 (3d Cir. 1990))); see, e.g., Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10-14 (1996) (citing
FED. R. EvID. 504 advisory committee's note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 242 (1972)); cf United States
v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 367-69 (1980) (explaining that although absence of a legislative
privilege from the Supreme Court's list of proposed privileges "would not compel the
federal courts to refuse to recognize [it because it was] omitted from the proposal, it does
suggest that the claimed privilege was not thought to be either indelibly ensconced in our
common law or an imperative of federalism"). But see DANIEL J. CAPRA, ADVISORY
COMMITTEE NOTES TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE THAT MAY REQUIRE CLARIFICATION

5-7, 31 (1998) (explaining that the Advisory Committee note for Rule 501 referred to rules
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B. Jurisdictionswith Broad Child Abuse Exceptions
Although the Ninth Circuit was reluctant to adopt a child abuse exception
broad enough to protect a witness-spouse's grandchild, other federal courts
have shown a greater willingness to recognize expansive child abuse
exceptions to the marital privileges. This section discusses the federal
courts, including military courts, the Tenth Circuit, and the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Texas, which have adopted child abuse
exceptions to the marital privileges that are broader than the exception
adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Banks.2 98 Each jurisdiction's form of the
exception will be discussed in turn.
1. The Military's Broad Child Abuse Exception, As Codified in Military
Rule of Evidence 504(D)
Until recently, Military Rule of Evidence 504 codified a relatively
constrained child abuse exception to the marital privileges. 99 In 2008,
however, after critics called for the adoption of a more protective child
abuse exception, drafters of the Military Rules of Evidence amended Rule
504 to provide for a much broadened exception. This section describes the
evolution of Military Rule of Evidence 504.
The military justice system is separate from the federal court system and
has codified its testimonial privileges in the Military Rules of Evidence,
which are used in courts-martial, or military courts presiding over criminal
proceedings. 30 0 In his article Expanding the 'Child of Either' Exception to
the Husband-Wife Privilege Under the New M.R.E. 504(D), Captain
Damian P. Richard of the U.S. Marine Corps discusses spousal privileges in
the Military Rules of Evidence. 30 1 These rules, unlike the Federal Rules of
Evidence, codify common-law evidentiary privileges. 30 2 In addition to the
privileges and corresponding exceptions specified in the Rules of Evidence,
however, courts-martial are also free to recognize the privileges and
exceptions federal courts have employed during criminal trials according to

that were never adopted and warning against treating the Advisory Committee proposals or
notes as "a totally accurate description of federal common law").
298. These courts' exceptions apply only to either the adverse spousal testimony privilege
or the marital communications privilege. None of the circuits have specifically stated that
the exceptions would apply to either privilege. It appears, however, that this distinction
depends only on the privilege invoked by a spouse in those particular cases, and has not
arisen out of a conscious effort on the part of the circuits to adopt the exception for one
privilege but not the other.
299. MIL. R. EVID. 504(c)(2)(A).
300. See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES R.C.M. 201(d) (2008). Courts-

martial have jurisdiction over prosecutions of military offenses as well as prosecutions of
crimes that violate both local and military law. Id.
301. Richard, supra note 202.
302. Compare FED. R. EVID. 501, with MIL. R. EvID. 501-13.
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Federal Rule of Evidence 501, as long as the privilege or exception is not
30 3
inconsistent with the Military Rules of Evidence.
Military Rule of Evidence 504(c)(2)(A) prohibits spouses from invoking
either marital privilege in "proceedings in which one spouse is charged with
a crime against the person or property of the other spouse or a child of
either.... "304 In 2000 and 2003, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed
Forces interpreted the meaning of the phrase "a child of either" in Rule 504
in such a way that the exception did not encompass the abuse of children
305
other than those of the defendant and his or her spouse.
Scholars subsequently called for a change in the military justice
system. 306 Proponents of a broad child abuse exception cited the current
tendency to restrict the application of the marital privileges by expanding
the exceptions to the rule, as evidenced in case law in the Tenth Circuit, the
District of Columbia, and thirty-three state jurisdictions. 30 7 Scholars also
cited military-specific policy rationale, arguing, "An exception to the
marital privileges covering minor children over whom a spouse is guardian
or in loco parentiswould ... help servicemembers effectively perform their

military duties while deployed because they would have an increased belief
in the security of their children," who were often cared for by adults other
than their parents. 30 8 Concurring and dissenting judges from prior cases
30 9
have made similar arguments over the years.

303. See MIL. R. EvID. 501(a)(4); see, e.g., United States v. Smith, 30 M.J. 1022, 1025-27
(A.F.C.M.R. 1990) (adopting the federal common-law exception to the marital
communications privilege that allows the government to compel a spouse's testimony
regarding confidential spousal communications when the two were joint participants in a
criminal venture).
304. MIL. R. EvID. 504(c)(2)(A). Two additional exceptions state that spousal testimony
may be compelled when the marriage was a "sham" or in cases in which the defendant
spouse is charged with the prostitution or immoral exploitation of his or her spouse. See MIL.
R. EvID. 504(c)(2)(B)-(C).
305. In United States v. McCollum, 58 M.J. 323 (C.A.A.F. 2003), the court held that,
because the defendant's wife's fourteen-year-old, mentally retarded sister, who had lived
with the couple for one month, was not a child of either spouse under Rule 504, the witnessspouse's testimony about her husband's confession that he had raped the child was
inadmissible. See id. at 334-42. The court acknowledged that an expanded exception would
well serve military personnel, whose children often stay with-and may be abused byrelatives and friends while their parents are deployed in military service, as well as busy,
nonmilitary working parents, many of whom must place their children in daycare, where
they are at risk of being abused. Id. at 342 n.6. The court, however, felt that "it is the
responsibility of the political elements of government to balance these competing
considerations in law." Id.; see also United States v. McElhaney, 54 M.J. 120, 131-32
(C.A.A.F. 2000) (declining to create an exception to the marital communications privilege
that would apply in cases of abuse of de facto children).
306. See, e.g., Connor, supra note 40, at 123-24.
307. Richard, supra note 202, at 162-63.
308. Id. at 170 (citing Connor, supra note 40, at 179-80).
309. See, e.g., McCollum, 58 M.J. at 344 (Crawford, J., concurring) (demanding de facto
child status for a child rape victim so that the exception to the marital communications
privilege would apply); McElhaney, 54 M.J. at 137 (Sullivan, J.,concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (calling for a broader exception to the marital privileges to include a de
facto child); United States v. McCarty, 45 M.J. 334, 336-37 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (Sullivan, J.,
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In 2007, drafters of the Manual for Courts-Martial explained that the
prior distinction between legal and de facto children "resulted in
unwarranted discrimination among child victims and ran counter to the
public policy of protecting children ....,,310 In response, the drafters
amended the definition of "child of either" in Military Rule of Evidence
504 so that the privileges could not be invoked during a trial for a crime
311
committed against almost any child.
2. Federal Courts Adopting Expansive Child Abuse Exceptions
This section details how circuits other than the Eighth and Ninth Circuits
have interpreted Rule 501 to form child abuse exceptions to the marital
privileges. In the four circuits that have created child abuse exceptions to
the marital privileges, 3 12 each has adopted a different form of the exception.
The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas, located in the
Fifth Circuit, has forged the broadest exception, holding that the marital
communications privilege should not apply to statements relating to a crime
where the victim is a child, even when the abuse did not occur in the
home. 313 The Tenth Circuit recognizes an exception to the marital
communications privilege in prosecutions for the abuse of any minor child

concurring) (opining that a child victim of sex abuse was a de facto child, triggering the
child abuse exception to the courts-martial marital communications privilege).
310. 2 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, MILITARY RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL § 504.03a (Supp.

2009).
311. Richard, supra note 202, at 156; see MIL. R. EVD. 504(d). The updated definition
provides,
(1)The term "a child of either" includes not only a biological child, adopted child,
or ward of one of the spouses but also includes a child who is under the permanent
or temporary physical custody of one of the spouses, regardless of the existence of
a legal parent-child relationship. For purposes of this rule only, a child is: (i) an
individual under the age of 18; or (ii) an individual with a mental handicap who
functions under the age of 18.
(2) The term "temporary physical custody" includes instances where a parent
entrusts his or her child with another. There is no minimum amount of time
necessary to establish temporary physical custody nor must there be a written
agreement. Rather, the focus is on the parent's agreement with another for
assuming parental responsibility for the child. For example, temporary physical
custody may include instances where a parent entrusts another with the care of
their child for recurring care or during absences due to temporary duty or
deployments.
Id.
312. These circuit courts are the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and
Tenth Circuits. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was the first federal court
to mention the possibility of a child abuse exception in United States v. Shipp, 409 F.2d 33
(4th Cir. 1969), but the issue was not determinative in that case. See id. at 35 n.3 (discussing
the state court's holding that the spousal abuse exception also applies when the victim is the
spouse's child).
313. See United States v. Martinez, 44 F. Supp. 2d 835 (W.D. Tex. 1999); infra notes
325-33 and accompanying text.
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living in the defendant and witness's home, regardless of the child's
relationship to the spouses. 314 Each court's approach is discussed in turn.
In United States v. Bahe, the Tenth Circuit extended the exception to the
marital communications privilege to include confidential communications
relating to the abuse of a minor child living in the home, regardless of
whether the victim was the child of the defendant or his or her spouse. 3 15 In
Bahe, a jury convicted the defendant of sexually abusing an eleven-year-old
female relative. 3 16 Bahe's wife had testified voluntarily at trial as to a
specific way the defendant initiated sex with her. 3 17 The district court
admitted her testimony because it was "precisely the act" described by the
eleven-year-old victim. 3 18 The district court agreed to admit Bahe's wife's
testimony to lend credibility to the child's description of Bahe's sexual
3 19
abuse.
Bahe appealed his conviction, arguing that the district court erred in
admitting testimony of his wife. 320 The Tenth Circuit acknowledged that it
had not yet adopted an exception to the marital communications privilege
that would allow a spouse's testimony in cases of abuse of a child not
related to the defendant. 321 The circuit court held in Bahe, however, that as
a matter of policy, there is "no significant difference ... between a crime
against a child of the married couple, against a stepchild living in the home
or . . . against an eleven-year-old relative visiting in the home. '322 In
formulating its expansion of the privilege, the court echoed Allery's
reasoning that child abuse is a "horrendous crime" that usually occurs in the
home and is often hidden unwittingly-or, out of fear of the abuser's
threats, intentionally-by the child. 32 3
Based on its "reason and
experience," the court concluded that it would be unconscionable to allow a
privilege based on promoting trusting and loving communications to
prevent a justifiably upset witness from testifying against his or her
pedophile spouse.324
314. See United States v. Bahe, 128 F.3d 1440 (10th Cir. 1997); infra notes 315-24 and
accompanying text.
315. Bahe, 128 F.3d at 1446.

316. Id.at 1441.
317. Id.
318. Id.

319. Id.
320. Id.
321. See id.
322. Id.at 1446.
323. Id.;
see supra notes 191-207.
324. Although the United States v.Bahe court's approach was clear-cut with regard to
the marital communications privilege, the Tenth Circuit has not been consistent in its
application of the exception when defendants invoke the adverse spousal testimony
privilege. Compare United States v. Jarvison, 409 F.3d 1221, 1231-32 (10th Cir. 2005)
(stating that a child abuse exception to the adverse spousal testimony privilege is "not
currently recognized by any federal court"), and Bahe, 128 F.3d at 1442 (arguing that it is
"clear" that the district court could not compel the defendant's wife to testify against her
husband if she did not choose to testify (citing Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 53
(1980))), with United States v. Castillo, 140 F.3d 874, 884-85 (10th Cir. 1998) (prohibiting
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United States v. Martinez,325 a case in the Western District of Texas,
introduced additional rationales for the child abuse exception. In this case,
the government charged the defendant with eleven acts of child abuse
against her two minor sons while they were patients in a hospital on
Lackland Air Force Base. 326 Martinez invoked the marital communications
privilege in a motion to suppress her ex-husband's testimony about
communications between them during their marriage. 327 The district court
denied Martinez's motion to suppress and adopted a broad exception to the
privilege that would apply in prosecutions for crimes committed against all
328
minors.
The Martinez court recognized its ability under Rule 501 to change the
marital privilege and cited instances in which other courts, both federal and
state, had expanded the spousal abuse exception to include child victims. 329
Balancing society's competing interests in protecting the marital
relationship and bringing child abusers to justice, the Martinez court
decided that the importance of protecting "voiceless and powerless"
children overwhelmed any value in the marital communications
privilege. 330 The court also suggested that child abuse was a direct offense
to the institution of marriage because the marital relationship exists to
"nurture and protect its children," and not merely to provide a safe haven in
which spouses may freely share their secrets with one another. 33 1
To bolster its position, the district court relied on Trammel's oft-cited
criticism of the privilege: when one spouse is willing to testify against the
other in a criminal case, the marriage is most likely damaged beyond repair,

the defendant's invocation of the adverse spousal testimony privilege because he was on trial
for sexually abusing his two daughters, but failing to make explicit its intention to apply
Bahe's exception to both marital privileges), and United States v. Allery, 526 F.2d 1362 (8th
Cir. 1975) (forming a child abuse exception to the adverse spousal testimony privilege).
325. 44 F. Supp. 2d 835 (W.D. Tex. 1999).
326. Id. at 836.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 837. The Martinez court's reasoning seemed to focus on children abused by
parents or stepparents within the home. See id. at 836-37 (discussing the damage a marriage
sustains "when the defendant-spouse is accused of abusing the children of that marriage" and
children who are "abused at the hands of a parent"). The language of the court's holding,
however, that "the marital communications privilege should not apply to statements relating
to a crime where the victim is a minor child," does not seem to limit the exception to
children related to the defendant, spouse, or children abused within the household. Id. at 837.
329. Id. at 836-37 (citing FED. R. EVID. 501; Trammel, 445 U.S. at 47; Bahe, 128 F.3d at
1446; United States v. White, 974 F.2d 1135, 1137-38 (9th Cir. 1992); Allery, 526 F.2d at
1367; Ludwig v. State, 931 S.W.2d 239, 244 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en banc)).
330. Id. at 837 ("Children, especially those of tender years who cannot defend themselves
or complain, are vulnerable to abuse. Society has a stronger interest in protecting such
children than in preserving marital autonomy and privacy .... '[A] contrary rule would make
children a target population within the marital enclave."' (quoting 25 CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5593, at 761-62
(1989)) (citing 2 DAVID W. LOUISELL & CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE
§ 218, at 886 (rev. ed. 1985))).
331. Id.

20101

1801

TO CA TCH A PREDATOR

leaving nothing for the privilege to protect. 332 The Martinez court posited
that this criticism is especially applicable when one spouse is on trial for
333
child abuse.
3. Additional Sources Supporting Broad Child Abuse Exceptions
The reasoning used by state courts adopting child abuse exceptions can
be instructive, both in illuminating the reasoning courts have used in

adopting such exceptions and also for federal courts looking to state courts
for guidance under Rule 501.
In Villalta v. Commonwealth,334 the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts interpreted a Massachusetts statute 335 that eliminated the

adverse

testimony and

marital

communications

privileges

"in

any

proceeding relating to child abuse." 3 36 The court construed the phrase
"child abuse" literally and held that the privilege could not be invoked
337
The court stated that
when the abuse of any child was at issue at trial.
there was no reason to deny the privilege when the child victim was related
to the defendant or his spouse but to allow the privilege when the victim

was unrelated. 338 The court asserted that crimes against both types of child
victims were equally serious, produced the same societal interest in
prosecuting and punishing the abuser, and caused the same evidentiary need
for a spouse's testimony. 339 In addition, the court held that compelling a
spouse to testify in either case was equally threatening to the couple's

332. Id. (citing Trammel, 445 U.S. at 52); cf United States v. Tsinnijinnie, 601 F.2d
1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1979) ("[W]hen a marriage has deteriorated to the point where one
spouse makes statements damaging to the other, that marriage will usually proceed to its fate
regardless of how the spousal privilege is applied."). But see supra note 130 (arguing that
Trammel's reasoning is misguided because a marriage is not necessarily beyond repair
simply because one spouse is willing to testify against the other). This reasoning, although
compelling for the adverse spousal testimony privilege, does not apply to the marital
communications privilege. It incorrectly assumes that the marital communications privilege
exists to protect the defendant's marriage only. While this policy drives the adverse spousal
testimony privilege, the marital communications privilege seeks to protect all marriages by
allowing spouses to confide in each other without fearing that their spouses will later air
their private thoughts in court. See Connor, supra note 40, at 142-43. This is why the
marital communications privilege may be invoked even after the defendant's marriage has
dissolved, as was the case in Martinez. See Martinez, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 836; see also United
States v. Marashi, 913 F.2d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 1990).
333. Martinez, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 837.
334. 702 N.E.2d 1148 (Mass. 1998).
335. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 233, § 20 (LexisNexis 2009).

336. Id.; Villalta, 702 N.E.2d at 1152. In Villalta, the defendant's wife attempted to
assert the adverse spousal testimony privilege at trial when the government called her to
testify against her husband at his prosecution for the alleged rape of a two-year-old child
whom the wife babysat periodically in the couple's home. Id. at 1149-50.
337. Villalta, 702 N.E.2d at 1152.
338. Id.
339. Id.
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marriage. 340 As a result, the court reversed the trial court's grant of the
1
witness-spouse's invocation of the adverse spousal testimony privilege. 34
In another state court case, JS. v. R.T.H.,342 the New Jersey Supreme
Court confronted the issue of whether a wife who suspects-or should
suspect-her husband of sexually abusing their neighbors' children has a
duty of care to prevent that abuse. 343 Although the court did not confront
the marital privilege directly, the issue of the wife's negligence necessitated
a discussion of the interplay between society's interest in preventing child
abuse and a couple's right to privacy in their marriage. 344 The court ruled
that the defendant's wife may have been negligent, reversing the trial
court's grant of summary judgment. 345 The court reasoned that although
conduct involving sexual abuse is "secretive, clandestine, and furtive," 346 a
male abuser's wife is in a unique position to observe signs of sexual abuse
because the abuser is often a married man, the abuse usually occurs in the
home of the abuser or the victim, and the offender-and presumably his
wife-often knows the child. 347 The court briefly noted the defendant's
interest in marital privacy, 34 8 but concluded that society's interest in
protecting children from sexual abuse outweighs the defendant's right to
privacy. 349 In support of the latter point, the court noted that New Jersey
legislatures have not been hesitant to pass statutes prescribing harsh
penalties and drastic limitations of civil liberties for child abusers,

340. Id. In fact, the court suggested that compelling a witness to testify against his or her
defendant-spouse when the defendant abused an unrelated child was less threatening to the
marriage than when the defendant abused his or her child or stepchild, thus giving the court a
stronger reason to deny the privilege. Id.
341. Id.
342. 714 A.2d 924 (N.J. 1998).
343. Id. at 926. The court also addressed the issue of whether a breach of that duty of
care, if it exists, is a proximate cause of the harm resulting from the abuse. Id. The
defendant had been convicted of sexually abusing two girls, ages twelve and fifteen, who
helped the defendant care for his horses. Id. The case on appeal was a civil suit brought by
the victims' family against the abuser's wife. Id. The victims contended that the wife was
negligent in failing to stop her husband from abusing the girls. Id. The trial court granted
summary judgment to the defendants, holding that, legally, she could not be found negligent.
Id. at 927. The appellate court reversed the grant of summary judgment. Id.
344. Id. at 930-32.
345. Id. at 936.
346. Id. at 929.
347. Id. at 930 (citing Chaney v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 73 (Ct. App. 1995);
Doe v. Franklin, 930 S.W.2d 921 (Tex. App. 1996); LAWRENCE A. GREENFIELD, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CHILD VICTIMIZERS: VIOLENT OFFENDERS AND

THEIR VICTIMS 5 (1996),
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/
CVVOATV.PDF.
348. See J.S., 714 A.2d at 931-32 (citing Merenoff v. Merenoff, 388 A.2d 951 (N.J.
1978)) (stating that scholars and courts have questioned whether procedural rules designed to
promote marital harmony and privacy, such as the doctrine of spousal incompetency, have
actually succeeded); see also Merenoff, 388 A.2d at 959 (eliminating the doctrine of spousal
incompetency and observing that the "threat to domestic harmony posed by a legal action
between spouses is an imponderable").
349. See J.S., 714 A.2d at 932.
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favoring protection of
expressing "'New Jersey's strong public policy
350
children over the privacy of an offending adult.'
In addition to state courts' rationales, there are many public policy
arguments for creating child abuse exceptions to the marital privileges. The
societal ramifications of child abuse are vast.35 1 Abused children are 25%
more likely to become pregnant as teenagers and 59% more likely to be
arrested as juveniles. 35 2 The consequences do not end once the abused
reach adulthood. 14% of imprisoned men and 36% of imprisoned women
in the United States were abused as children. 35 3 Adults who were abused as
children are 28% more likely than a nonabused person to be arrested and
30% more likely to become violent criminals. 354 Sexual abuse is especially
pernicious: sexually abused children are 2.5 times more likely to develop
alcohol abuse problems and 3.8 times more likely to develop drug
addiction. 355 Prohibiting the invocation of the marital privileges allows the
government to secure convictions of child abusers more often,
accomplishing the four "classical" goals of punishment: retribution,
rehabilitation, deterrence, and incapacitation. 356 The stark statistics above
underscore the importance of accomplishing these goals.
In advocating for the formation or expansion of child abuse exceptions,
many courts and scholars have argued that the policy behind the marital
privileges has eroded, thereby tipping the balance in favor of an
exception. 357 One particular criticism of the marital privileges-the marital
358
communications privilege in particular-is that they are ineffective.
Detractors argue that because married couples are unaware of the existence
of the marital communications privilege and, therefore, do not rely on it
when deciding whether to confide in each other, it cannot serve its purpose
of encouraging marital communication. 359 A related criticism of the
350. Id. (quoting J.S. v. R.T.H., 693 A.2d 1191, 1194 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997));
see Megan's Law, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-1 to -21 (West 2009) (requiring sex offenders to
register with law enforcement, keep the authorities informed of their whereabouts, and
provide communities with advance notice of their intention to relocate there).
351. See, e.g., Childhelp, supra note 201. The statistics that follow do not distinguish
between sexual abuse and other forms of abuse or neglect.
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. See Brian J. Telpner, Note, Constructing Safe Communities: Megan's Laws and the
Purposes of Punishment, 85 GEO. L.J. 2039, 2055 (1997) (citing Toni M. Massaro, Shame,
Culture, andAmerican CriminalLaw, 89 MICH. L. REv. 1880, 1890 (1991)).
357. See, e.g., United States v. Tsinnijinnie, 601 F.2d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 1979);

1 BROUN ET AL., supra note 127, § 86, at 340-41; supra note 348 and accompanying text.
358. See 1 BROUN ET AL., supra note 127, § 86, at 340-41 (stating that spouses confide in
each other because they trust one another, not because the marital communications privilege
protects their conversations); supra note 348 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Tsinnyinnie,
601 F.2d at 1039 ("Experience demonstrates that the potential benefits of the marital
privilege are often more imaginary than real.").
359. See Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183,
245-46 (1972) (acknowledging the confidential communication privilege is one "of whose
existence the parties in all likelihood are unaware"); 1 BROUN ET AL., supra note 127, § 86, at
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adverse spousal testimony privilege is that when one spouse is willing to
testify against another, the marriage is already doomed and cannot be
helped by the marital privilege. 360 Finally, some critics of the marital
privileges believe that the privileges are part of the sexist tradition of
husbands' legal domination of their wives. 36 1 To these theorists, the marital
privileges are tools employed disproportionately by men to prevent their
362
wives from asserting any power over them.
In summary, federal courts have been inconsistent in their approaches to
the child abuse exception to the marital privileges. The Eighth and Ninth
Circuits have limited the application of the child abuse exception to a child
of either spouse or the functional equivalent of a child of either spouse,
respectively. Other federal courts addressing the issue, however, have
adopted more expansive forms of the child abuse exception. These courts
are the military courts-martial, the Tenth Circuit, and the Western District
of Texas.
III. FEDERAL COURTS SHOULD ADOPT AN EXPANSIVE CHILD ABUSE
EXCEPTION TO THE TWO MARITAL PRIVILEGES

Although Jerry Banks's conviction thankfully remained intact on other
grounds, Banks shows the danger in the chaotic system of marital privileges
and exceptions resulting from Rule 501, under which each federal court is
left to its own devices in deciding whether a party or witness may invoke a
marital privilege. Banks was described by prosecutors as one of the "worst
sex offenders ever seen in Idaho," 3 63 but, had other evidence of his guilt not
existed, his invocation of the marital privilege may have allowed him to

340 (stating that the anticipation of legal proceedings "is not one of those factors which
materially influence in daily life the degree of fullness of marital disclosures"); Robert M.
Hutchins & Donald Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence: Family
Relations, 13 MINN. L. REv. 675, 682 (1929) (suggesting that lawyers are the only citizens
aware of the marital communications privilege and that their marriages are no more
harmonious than those of other professionals); see also supra note 348 and accompanying
text (citing New Jersey courts as doubting the effectiveness of the marital privileges). But
see Mark Reutlinger, Policy, Privacy, and Prerogatives: A Critical Examination of the
ProposedFederalRules of Evidence As They Affect MaritalPrivilege, 61 CAL. L. REv 1353,
1374-78 (1973) (discussing the validity of the presumption that individuals are unaware of
the privilege); Watts, supra note 39, at 597 (arguing that even though most couples are
unaware of the marital privileges, they expect complete confidentiality).
360. See supra notes 130, 332-33 and accompanying text.
361. See, e.g., Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 52 (1980) (describing the idea that
women lack a separate legal identity from their husbands as "archaic" and holding that only
the witness-spouse may hold the adverse spousal testimony privilege); Tsinnijinnie, 601 F.2d
at 1038 (stating that much criticism of the marital privileges "stems from distaste for the
paternalistic attitude toward marriage it reflects").
362. See 8 WIGmORE, supra note 97, § 2227, at 212 (describing the common-law adverse
spousal testimony privilege as held by a husband to preclude the testimony of his wife);
Privileged Communications, supra note 153, at 1587 n. 170 (estimating that ninety percent of
the spouses who invoke a marital privilege at trial are husbands).
363. Fox 12 Idaho, Banks To Be Sentenced, http://www.foxl2idaho.com/Global/
story.asp?s=6188783 (last visited Feb. 21, 2010).
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escape a mandatory life sentence at a retrial without his wife's testimony. 364
Such a result would shock the conscience.
Federal courts should adopt a common-law exception to both the marital
communications privilege and the adverse spousal testimony privilege that
would apply in cases of abuse of any minor child, 365 regardless of whether
the child is related to the defendant or his spouse or whether the child lives
in their household. 36 6 Because this exception would apply to both the
adverse spousal testimony privilege, held by the witness-spouse, 367 and the
marital communications privilege, held by both spouses, 36 8 it would dually
prevent a defendant from precluding his or her spouse's voluntary
testimony and allow a court to compel an unwilling witness-spouse to
369
testify.
The importance of achieving justice for child victims of sexual and
physical abuse easily defeats the competing policy of maintaining the
364. See supra note 246 and accompanying text.
365. The types of abuse contemplated by this exception are limited to physical and sexual
abuse and do not include other potential crimes against children, such as financial fraud.
The latter category of criminal activity does not trigger the policy concerns that compel an
expansive exception. Similarly, this Note's proposed exception also raises the question of
which victims would be "minor children" for purposes of the exception. Although this Note
finds it futile to lay such specific parameters of the exception, revised Military Rule of
Evidence 504 may provide courts with helpful guidance. See MIL. R. EVID. 504(d)(1) ("[A]
child is: (i) an individual under the age of 18; or (ii) an individual with a mental handicap
who functions under the age of 18.").
366. Although a Federal Rule of Evidence codifying such an exception would be ideal,
the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure has concluded that it is "neither necessary
nor desirable" to amend the Rules to include an exception protecting the child of either the
defendant or the witness-spouse. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., COMM. ON RULES
OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, REPORT ON THE NECESSITY AND DESIRABILITY OF AMENDING THE
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE TO CODIFY A "HARM TO CHILD" EXCEPTION TO THE MARITAL

PRIVILEGES 6-10 (2007), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Harm toChild_
ReporLtoCongress.pdf. The Committee so concluded not because it found the exception
objectionable, but because the amendment did not meet the high burden needed to begin the
arduous process of amending a rule of evidence. See id. (finding that there is no significant
circuit split and that the existing rule was neither unworkable nor unconstitutional). The
exception this Note proposes is admittedly broader than the proposed amendment rejected by
the Committee, but the adoption of the proposed exception is both necessary and desirable in
individual courts.
367. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
368. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
369. In contrast to this Note's suggested approach, some states have chosen to codify a
child abuse exception for the marital communications privilege, but not the adverse spousal
testimony privilege. See supra notes 210-14. These jurisdictions reason that the child abuse
exception aims to prevent only the defendant-not the witness-spouse-from invoking the
privilege, so when the defendant does not hold the adverse spousal testimony privilege, there
is no need for an exception to it. See, e.g., State v. Taylor, 642 So. 2d 160, 165-66 (La.
1994) (explaining that Louisiana has not adopted any exceptions to the adverse spousal
testimony privilege because the privilege may not be exercised by the defendant). This
Note, however, rejects that reasoning and posits that during child abuse proceedings, neither
spouse should be able to invoke a marital privilege. Although this may result in the
involuntary testimony of a witness-spouse, society's interest in admitting the witnessspouse's testimony in child abuse cases outweighs its desire not to compel spouses to testify
against one another.
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sanctity of marriages. There is no sanctity in a marriage that has stayed
together at the expense of a child's welfare. An expanded exception to the
marital privileges will allow prosecutors to present a complete case against
defendants guilty of monstrous acts of child abuse.
Current forms of the child abuse exception are based on arbitrary and
illogical parameters. 370 Federal courts must adhere to the Federal Rules of
Evidence when developing evidentiary law, but Rule 501 allows for a broad
child abuse exception. Under Rule 501, federal courts are free to use their
"reason and experience" to change the common-law rules of privilege when
necessary. 37 1 A federal court's reason and experience analysis balances the
benefit of a privilege with the value of the testimony at issue. In child
abuse prosecutions, the value of the witness-spouse's testimony always
outweighs the privilege's benefit.
A. The IllogicalEvolution of the Child Abuse Exception in Federal Courts
Due to Congress's refusal to codify the evidentiary privileges in the
Federal Rules of Evidence, federal courts have developed privileges and
exceptions only as the need has arisen. 372 As a result, federal common-law
privileges have developed unevenly, leaving child victims of abuse better
protected in some circuits than in others. 37 3 The boundaries courts have
drawn between child victims, based on whether the child is related to the
defendant or whether the defendant abused the child in the defendant's
home, came about because the child abuse exception grew out of the
spousal abuse exception, which was premised on the belief that a
defendant's abuse of his or her spouse damaged the harmony of the
374
couple's marriage and so did not promote the purpose of the privilege.
As a result, the main question courts asked when considering the adoption
of a child abuse exception was whether the abuse of the child upset the
family harmony, 375 which was only the case if the minor was the child of
the witness-spouse.
Recent decisions have cited numerous policy reasons to adopt the child
abuse exception beyond the question of whether the crime disrupts the
family harmony of the couple. 376 This renders the distinctions among child
abuse victims moot. Whether a child is related to the defendant or his
spouse does not make the protection of that child more or less important.
The question of whether a crime of child abuse is a crime against the
defendant's spouse is irrelevant. Child abuse is an offense not only against
the victim, but also against society as a whole.
370. See supra Part II (describing federal courts' various approaches to the child abuse
exception).
371. See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
372. See supra notes 51-89 and accompanying text.
373. See supra Part II.
374. See supra notes 188-90 and accompanying text.
375. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
376. See Part ll.B.
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This Note's proposed exception to the marital privileges is comparable to
the exception developed in the Tenth Circuit, 377 but goes further in that it
would also apply in cases of child abuse occurring outside the home.
Although an exception like that applied by the Tenth Circuit would be
sufficiently broad in cases of child abuse occurring in the defendant's home,
it stops short of protecting children abused in their own homes or, for
instance, at school or daycare, where many children spend the majority of
their time. 378 There is no reason to base the scope of the protection of
children on the location of their abuse.
B. The Rule 501 Analysis
This Note's proposed exception, while unprecedented in its breadth
among the courts of appeals, would fall well within the discretion provided
by Rule 501. In enacting the Rule, Congress expressed its intention that
courts make changes to privilege law on a case-by-case basis. 3 79 However,
in any case of child abuse, a proper Rule 501 reason and experience
analysis will result in an exception to the marital privileges.
A survey of recent federal court decisions shows an increasing
willingness to limit the marital privileges, 380 if not yet to the extent
suggested in this Note. In enacting Rule 501, however, Congress made
clear that federal courts may-and should--consider state law when
developing the law of privileges. 38 1 A review of state privilege law, 382 both
codified and developed through case law, reveals that sixteen states prohibit
spouses from invoking one or both of the marital privileges when the
defendant has abused any child. 383 While these states alone do not establish
an overwhelming trend, of the other thirty-three jurisdictions with child
abuse exceptions, in all but twelve, even minors who are not the child of
either spouse are protected. 384 These figures include twelve states
employing an exception in cases of abuse of any person residing in the
home 385 and nine states adopting exceptions that prohibit the invocation of
marital privileges when the defendant is charged with abusing a child in the

377. See United States v. Bahe, 128 F.3d 1440, 1441 (10th Cir. 1997) (recognizing an
exception to the marital communications privilege for spousal testimony relating to the abuse
of a minor child within the spouses' household); supra notes 315-24 and accompanying text.
378. See United States v. McCollum, 58 M.J. 323, 342 n.6 (C.A.A.F. 2003) (recognizing
the equal importance of protecting children whose parents must leave them in daycare
facilities or other locations for purposes of supervision); supra notes 308-09 and
accompanying text.
379. See supra notes 89, 266 and accompanying text.
380. See supra Part ll.B.
381. See supra notes 264, 282 and accompanying text.
382. See supra notes 209-14 and accompanying text.
383. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
384. See supra notes 209-14 and accompanying text.
385. Depending on a jurisdiction's interpretation of "residing," these exceptions would
cover at least some cases of abuse of children not related to either spouse. See supra note
211 and accompanying text.
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care, custody, or control of either spouse. 386 Thus, the trend among state
jurisdictions certainly supports the adoption of a broader exception by all
federal circuits under Rule 501.
In addition, there is no reason a Rule 501 "reason and experience
analysis" may not include the consultation of state statutes other than those
codifying marital privileges. Here, one finds a disconnect between statutes
aiming to prevent child abuse, such as Megan's Law, 387 and narrow
exceptions to the marital privileges. It is inconsistent for legislatures to
curtail child abusers' civil liberties to prevent them from abusing another
child,388 but at the same time to allow courts to undermine the prosecution
of those same sex offenders when they are arrested. The willingness of
legislators to enact comprehensive laws providing harsh penalties for sex
offenders demonstrates their belief that the public policy of preventing
future child abuse outweighs the offenders' individual rights. 389 Courts
should heed the public policy evinced by statutes such as Megan's Law so
that both legislative and judicial action promote the prosecution of
perpetrators of child abuse.
C. Utilizing the FederalCourts' Balancing Tests To Support an Expansive
ChildAbuse Exception
Courts must abide by Rule 501, but, as described in Part I.C, federal
courts utilize two additional types of balancing tests when determining
whether a privilege may be invoked: Wigmore's utilitarian four-factor test
and a public policy balancing test that courts turn to when deciding issues
of both the adverse spousal testimony privilege and the marital
communications privilege. Wigmore's test does not support the marital
communications privilege when invoked in a child abuse prosecution. The
public policy test leads to the same conclusion regarding both marital
privileges.
1. Wigmore's Utilitarian Test
The marital communications privilege
balancing test for privileges protecting

fails Wigmore's four-part
communications made in

386. See supra note 212 and accompanying text. Again, a state's interpretation of what
constitutes "care, custody, or control" could render this exception so broad that would it be
identical to the proposed exception in this Note. See, e.g., MIL. R. EvID. 504(d)(2)
(specifying that "no minimum amount of time [is] necessary to establish [the] temporary
physical custody" that triggers the application of the child abuse exception). This definition
of "custody" is so broad that the exception will apply in nearly all instances of child abuse.
See supra note 311 and accompanying text.
387. See supra note 350.
388. See supra note 350 and accompanying text.
389. See supra note 350 and accompanying text.
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the first factor, but may fail the second,
confidence. 390 The privilege39fulfills
1
and surely fails the last two.

The first factor in Wigmore's test requires that the communicator
This factor depends on the
reasonably expect confidentiality. 392
in general, it seems likely that
but,
circumstances of the communications,
to a spouse do so because they
child
of
a
abuse
their
disclosing
defendants
expect their statement to be confidential. This Note assumes that the
marital privileges meet this condition.
Wigmore's second factor requires that the expected confidentiality of the
communication is essential in maintaining the relationship between the
speaker and the listener. 393 The marital communications privilege rarely
satisfies this factor because spouses generally are unaware of the privilege
and therefore do not rely upon it to preserve the confidentiality of their
communications. 394 It is widely believed that, other than lawyers, virtually
no one is aware of the existence of the marital privileges.3 95 Even lawyers
who are familiar with the marital communications privilege do not
experience more marital harmony than other professionals. 396 On the other
hand, when a child abuser discusses the abuse with his or her spouse, it is
possible that the abuser is aware of the privilege and would not otherwise
disclose the abuse if not for the privilege's existence. In Banks's case, this
is especially likely since he had already experienced a criminal prosecution
for the molestation of his son 397 and therefore may have been aware of the
existence of the marital communications privilege.
Third, the Wigmore test requires that the relationship between speaker
and listener be "one which in the opinion of the community ought to be
sedulously fostered. '398 It is doubtful that the community would be
committed to fostering a relationship between a child abuser and his or her
spouse. 399 By abusing defenseless children, defendants have forfeited the
right to enjoy the comfort obtained by confiding one's secrets in a loved
one.

390. See supra notes 165-69 and accompanying text (discussing courts' application of
Wigmore's utilitarian balancing test).
391. These two factors mandate that the relationship between the defendant and the
witness be one that the community believes "ought to be sedulously fostered" and that the
injury caused to the relationship by the disclosure of the communication at trial be greater
than the benefit gained by the admission of the evidence. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 97, § 2285,
at 527; see also supra note 167 and accompanying text.
392. See supra note 167.
393. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
394. See supra notes 358-59 and accompanying text.
395. See supra note 359 and accompanying text.
396. See supra note 359 and accompanying text.
397. See supra note 246.
398. See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 97, § 2285, at 527.
399. See, e.g., supra note 350 and accompanying text (discussing a New Jersey statute
reflecting the legislature's willingness to protect children from abuse, even at the expense of
the defendant's right to privacy).
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Finally, Wigmore proposed that a court should recognize a privilege only
when "[t]he injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the
communications [is] greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct
disposal of litigation. ' 40 0 As the next section discusses, the marital
privileges in child abuse cases fail to satisfy this factor because the benefit
of admitting the testimony-increasing the likelihood of a guilty
defendant's conviction-is much greater than the injury to the couple's
relationship.
2. Balancing the Benefits of Allowing the Privilege with the Need To
Admit a Witness-Spouse's Testimony
The many reasons for a broadened exception have been outlined in the
cases described above, 40 1 but boil down to this: the importance of
admitting a spouse's evidence overpowers the competing public policies
underlying the marital privileges. As discussed next, the admission of a
witness-spouse's testimony is an important societal interest.
The need to effect justice for child victims of abuse is critical. One
cannot understate the abhorrent nature of child abuse.40 2 Not only is it a
painful and frightening experience during childhood, a time in which all
children deserve safe, loving, and carefree surroundings, but its
ramifications also last long into adulthood. 40 3 If protecting individual
children from the consequences of abuse is not reason enough to curb the
reach of the marital privileges, the ripple effect of that abuse on the rest of
society must be.
In addition, there is an especially critical need for courts to admit all
available evidence in child abuse trials. Prosecutors of child abusers often
possess little evidence against the defendant because, typically, there are
few witnesses to instances of child abuse.4 04 Because it is so often an
intrahousehold crime, 40 5 the offender, the victim, and the person in whom
the offender confides-the spouse-will be the only parties with any
knowledge of the crime. Moreover, the unique nature of the relationship
between abuser and victim creates a situation in which the child feels
powerless to reveal the abuse or testify about it.4 0 6 When a defendant's
spouse knows of the crime, therefore, courts must admit the spouse's
testimony, whether voluntary or compelled.
Finally, this section considers the importance of the public policies
preventing the dissolution of the
underlying the marital privileges:

400. See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 97, § 2285, at 527.
401. See supra Part ll.B.
402. See supra notes 352-55 and accompanying text.
403. See supra notes 352-55 and accompanying text.
404. See supra notes 200-03 and accompanying text.
405. See supra notes 200-03 and accompanying text.
406. See supra note 323 and accompanying text.
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defendant's marriage 40 7 and ensuring the privacy of marital
communications. 408 Turning to the second part of the balancing test, the
public policy supporting the marital privileges is relatively weak compared
to the harm in excluding the witness-spouse's testimony. When courts
compare the benefits described above to determine the applicability of a
marital privilege, the value in admitting a witness-spouse's testimony
outweighs that of protecting the defendant's marriage. First, although
marriage is a respected institution important for the personal fulfillment of
U.S. citizens, 40 9 society has a stronger interest in the administration of
justice in child abuse prosecutions. Although it may strike some as
immoral to compel an unwilling witness to participate in the downfall of his
or her spouse, 4 10 a possible result of this Note's proposed exception, this
injustice nevertheless pales in comparison to the immorality of the
witness's desired alternative: concealing one's knowledge of the abuse of
an innocent child. The same concept inheres when comparing the value of
privacy, which underlies the marital communications privilege, 4 11 with the
value of punishing child abusers. Society may value an individual's right to
privacy, 4 12 but not at the high cost of a loss of crucial evidence.
This Note's proposed child abuse exception is quite broad, which may
trouble courts concerned about the waning utility of the marital privileges.
The danger of the child abuse exception encroaching upon the marital
privileges, however, is minimal. First, while the child abuse exception
suggested here is expansive, it is not novel. 4 13 Both federal and state courts
have employed this form of the exception without unduly impinging upon
the marital privileges. 4 14 Second, the instances in which the exception will
apply are limited. Child abuse prosecutions are heard in federal courts only
when the defendant has violated a federal statute in the course of the abuse.
Such statutes are limited in both number and applicability. 4 15 This is
illustrated by the fact that not every circuit has needed to create a child
abuse exception. 4 16 Finally, even if all federal courts were to adopt the
proposed exception, the additional cases in which the child abuse exception
407. This is the most commonly cited rationale for the adverse spousal testimony
privilege. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
408. This is the purpose of the marital communications privilege. See supra notes 147-51
and accompanying text.
409. See supra notes 170-72 and accompanying text.
410. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
411. See supra notes 146-51, 173 and accompanying text.
412. See supra notes 175-76 and accompanying text.
413. See supra Part II.B.
414. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez, 44 F. Supp. 2d 835, 837 (W.D. Tex. 1999)
(adopting a child abuse exception applying in cases of abuse any minor child without
suggesting any willingness to abrogate the marital privileges in other types of cases); see
also supra notes 325-33 and accompanying text.
415. See 18 U.S.C. § 2241-2245 (2006) (delineating federal statutes regarding sexual
abuse); id. § 2251-2260A (describing federal prohibitions related to the sexual exploitation
of children, including all offenses related to child pornography).
416. See note 312 and accompanying text (stating that only four circuits have heard cases
involving the child abuse exception).
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would apply, though important, are few. For instance, this Note's exception
would apply if the defendant abused a niece or nephew, a neighbor's child,
or a child whom the defendant supervised in a daycare facility. Beyond
these types of situations, there are few instances in which the defendant's
spouse would know about a defendant's abuse of a child.
Lastly, as discussed in the previous section, many have doubted that the
marital privileges have succeeded in accomplishing their dual policy
goals. 417 If the exclusion of a witness-spouse's testimony will have no
positive societal effect, the courts have an additional reason to admit a
witness-spouse's critical evidence of a child's abuse.
CONCLUSION

All federal courts faced with defendants or witnesses who invoke a
marital privilege to preclude spousal testimony related to the abuse of any
child should adopt the expansive child abuse exception articulated in this
Note. The current system of haphazard expansion and constriction of child
abuse exceptions could result in a prosecutor's failure to secure a conviction
for a dangerous defendant who has committed abhorrent acts of abuse. A
child abuse exception that eradicates the marital privileges in all cases of
child abuse is necessary for the benefits it provides to both individual
victims and to society at large by bringing a criminal to justice. When
children have been abused, society has failed them once. Courts should
refuse to fail them again.

417. See supra notes 394-96 and accompanying text.

